

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY
IN NORTH AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

BEST
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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student and do not necessarily represent the view of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this cross-cultural, comparative study is to develop a mid-range theory of the politicization of the military in monarchies and to offer explanations for exceptions to the theory. Three North African societies, Libya, Morocco, and Ethiopia, are examined in depth to determine elements common to the politicization of the military. Two Southeast Asian countries, Thailand, and Cambodia, are then analyzed to validate the theory. Appendices are included to give a brief explanation of General Systems Theory (David Easton) and to provide extensive data on the countries examined.

In a world where the most common means of illegally seizing political power is through the coup, the need for such a theory is self-evident. The treatise is both a political science and a military scholastic work since it encompasses the scope of both of the sciences; their inter-relationship promises practical application in both disciplines.

Generally, the military is politicized in four stages. The first stage, that of a relatively apolitical, passive role of the army is a common starting point. The second stage is where the army discovers that it has valid claims as an interest group and some capacity politically to achieve its demands--a stage through which the military must pass if it is to be able to overthrow the monarch.

The third level of military involvement which follows stage #2 is both an intensification of the second stage and a fuller recognition of national problems. In the final stage the military can no longer countenance the situation as it exists and takes the political leadership by force or threat of force.

Two parameters which are the best indicators of the current relationship of the monarch with the military are the "legitimacy" of the monarchy and the "problems" the society is encountering. If the monarch sacrifices legitimacy for expediency or through carelessness and can not reduce real or perceived problems to an acceptable level a critical point will eventually be reached at which the military leadership will take action.

Rulers who aspire to continue to rule as well as reign must have both special qualifications and practice a policy of depoliticization of the military. The first of these tasks requires the king to have an established record of leadership over a period of time in military affairs. Depoliticization requires the prevention of the formation of meaningful political relationships within the military. Loyalties must be to the throne first and to military leaders second; either many competing organizations within the military must be formed or leadership must be changed frequently. More ideally, the king must be the real military leader as well as the titular one.

The theory establishes the groundwork for its application to other authoritarian societies on a mid-range level and its integration into general systems theory.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their scholastically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Now that the military has become the key decision-making element in at least eight of the Afro-Asian countries, we are confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of the military in the political development in the new states.¹

The ten years which have elapsed since the RAND study for which the above was written have witnessed the continued trend towards military rule. Since May, 1969, in North Africa alone, the military have seized control in Sudan, Libya, and Somalia. Unfortunately, the passage of time has seen only a moderate improvement in the scholastic effort to analyze and understand why the military seizes power. Perhaps more significant is the specific lack of comparative studies which analyze the relationship between the military and the other groups which might have prevented the military from seizing power.

It is the objective of this essay to make a contribution towards filling this scholastic void by studying the

¹L. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," J. Johnson (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 69.

relationship of the monarch to the military in North Africa and Southeast Asia. This cross-cultural, comparative study develops a mid-range theory of the politicization of the military in monarchies and offers explanations for exceptions to the theory.

In a world where "...the coup has become by far the commonest means of seizing political power illegally,"² and the military the most frequent executor of the coup, a clear need exists for theories of the politicization of the military. Such a theory is both a political science theory and a military one since it encompasses the scope of both of the sciences; their inter-relationship promises practical application in both disciplines.

A mid-range approach is utilized since it best fits the scope and resources of this effort, and is consistent with a current trend of political science. While middle range strategies do "not promise the relevance of global theories of social, economic, and political change,"³ they at least retain the potential for universal adaptability and explanation.

The removal of King Idris of Libya in September, 1969, reduced the list of monarchs in North Africa to Hassan II of Morocco, and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Is their ability to

²D.J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup D'Etat (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. ix.

³R. Rose, "Dynamic tendencies in the authority of regimes," World Politics, 21(July, 1969), p. 607.

keep the military in check due to unique circumstances, or have they employed the same techniques to this end? Will they be able to continue to control the military, or are we observing the maturation of a process which will lead to ultimate overthrow of the monarchy by the military? What lessons do the Libyan, Cambodian, and Thai examples provide?⁴

It would obviously be foolish to attempt to predict military intervention with any degree of precision. However, it is the hypothesis of this paper that the military can be placed on a continuum of probable involvement, and that the major causes of intervention by the military can be isolated. The final judgment as to whether the king can prevail will depend on his ability to neutralize the military by preventing it from moving along the continuum to the point of intervention; this can be done by removing the major reasons for the military involvement in politics and by controlling the special factors unique to the particular country. The potential of military rule being successful is considered here only as it is a factor in the assumption of power.⁵

The case studies of countries in North Africa and Southeast Asia which follow help clarify why the hypothesis is true and give a fuller insight into the relationship between the military and the monarchy. It is further hoped

⁴The Cambodian Coup of March, 1970, the Libyan Coup of September, 1969, and the Thai Coup of June, 1932.

⁵The success of military governments is another field of study; the study here is limited to initial consolidation to insure success of the coup.

that it will be useful in fulfilling "one of the purposes of comparative analysis...to analyze societal change in such a fashion that the conclusions and hypotheses can in fact be assessed by unfolding events."⁶

Two assumptions have been made: first, that the military/monarchy relationship is critical to understanding and evaluating the potential intervention of the military in politics; and second, that a theory developed utilizing monarchies will be adaptable to other forms of government. The importance of both assumptions will become clearer later in the paper.

The methodology employed is reflected in the organization of the paper. Chapter Two will develop the theory by utilizing general materials(though when possible North African oriented) on military intervention in politics. Concurrently, the North African case studies which appear as Chapter Three have been developed. It was the intention to perform both functions simultaneously so that the case-studies would fit and support the theory.

Selection of Ethiopia, Morocco, and Libya can be considered both random and intentional: random in the sense that they reflect the two surviving monarchies in North Africa and the most recent example of the elimination of a monarchy by the military; intentional because they fit the "most-

⁶M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. vii.

different" mode of theory development since they reflect a cross-section of North Africa (geographical, religious, etc.).

Upon completion of the theory development stage,⁷ the theory has been verified and expanded by studying the Southeast Asian cases. Thailand and Cambodia were selected because they reflect a "most-similar" basis of exploration. Cambodia is the most recent case of monarchy being overthrown in Southeast Asia and the 1932 coup in Thailand tests the theory historically. Southeast Asia (Thailand and Cambodia in particular) provides a good vehicle of analysis because of the author's study, travel, and experience in this area in conjunction with the U.S. Army's Foreign Area Specialist Program.

The final chapter of the paper is the conclusion. The objectives of the conclusion are to summarize the major tenets of the theory, to evaluate the efficacy of both the paired-relationship analysis and the paradigm employed, and to offer suggestions for future study in this area.

⁷It should be emphasized that the technique employed was to fully develop and record the theory based on the North African study prior to commencing detailed study of the Asian cases. This is important as a validation, expansion, and application test of the theory.

Chapter 2

THEORY DEVELOPMENT

General

The organizing concept employed here belongs in the behavioral orientation known as General Systems Theory, and the writings of David Easton, in particular, which have shaped many of the ideas implicit to the organization of the paper. No detailed discussion of these concepts will be presented in the text since terms such as "Environment," "Boundary," "Input," "Output," "Feedback," etc. are widely understood.¹

While Easton's system is generally applicable, it is important to remember that the system that is being analyzed is in fact a sub-system. It is a sub-system in which the level of analysis is primarily the individual; the king, and a varying number of members of the military. Since the military leaders are an elite they normally have a special access to the king, making the relationship very direct and the feedback very rapid. This special relationship makes it possible to portray these two power centers as competing along a continuum along which a gain of power by one is a loss of power by the other.

Both of the actors in such a system are influenced by

¹See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of Easton's works as they apply to this paper. For more detailed study see his The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

many of the same environmental factors, but often in different proportions. This is true because in monarchies there are really "two co-existing subsystems--one directed toward the allocation of traditional values and the other towards the allocation of modern values."² The king has a natural tendency to devote more attention to the traditional system than does an enlightened military which is constantly exposed to modern values.

Several definitions are important. What is a king? Many systems exist which call the leader a king. Among these are "parliamentary monarchy," "oligarchical monarchy," and the more traditional form of monarchy, the "ruling monarchy." "In the ruling monarchy, the crown is the principal source of legitimacy, and the king rules as well as reigns. A ruling monarchy is not necessarily an absolute monarchy."³ This definition becomes critical in the determination of when a monarch has been overthrown. Thus, a ruling monarch who is deposed by the military and allowed to continue to reign but not rule is for the purposes of this study not considered to be a king. Conversely, a king who renounces his kingship but continues to rule and control the royal symbols is still very much a king, regardless of what he calls himself.

²C. Clark, "Social Change and Communication of Legitimacy," The Journal of Developing Areas, 5(July, 1971), p. 581.

³S.P. Huntington, "Political Modernization of traditional monarchies," Daedalus, (Summer, 1966), p. 764.

The military in the developing nations normally refers to the army, but may include elements of an air force and/or a navy. This paper does not include the police in the term military even though in some cases it is armed with weapons normally associated with the armed forces. Police in most cases have an orientation and loyalty to different sources of authority than does the army and are frequently utilized as a counter force to check the power of the military forces.

Two other terms, legitimacy and authority, are closely related and need some explanation. Authority is a word which has a variety of distinct, but related meanings, in the social sciences.⁴ In this case, authority means the ability to gain obedience, compliance, and support. Authority then is no more than acceptance of the crown in the sense of what the military is willing to do to meet the king's wishes.

This is significantly different from the term political legitimacy. "We may define political legitimacy as the quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime."⁵ How the public and the military perceive this right to rule has a definite impact on the king's ability to command action. Legitimacy can either increase or decrease over a period of time, but is seldom if ever transferred from

⁴See R. Rose, "Dynamic Tendencies in the Authority of Regimes," World Politics, XXI(July, 1969), p. 604.

⁵R. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review, LX(September, 1966), p. 548.

the king to the people or military peacefully. "Such a change would involve a basic shift in legitimacy from the sovereignty of the monarch...and such changes generally require either time or revolution."⁶

Legitimacy is one of the major variables which is present in each of the monarch/military relationships. How legitimate the king is perceived to be determines how susceptible he is to overthrow, because this perception shapes the attitudes of the military. The attitude of the military towards the monarch is developed over a period of time and is also dependent on how effectively the monarch fulfills his role. The relationship determines how many, or few, unsolved problems and how much ineffectiveness the military will accept prior to becoming involved in politics. The relationship also affects how the monarch utilizes and controls the military, determining the capacity of the military to intervene.

Stages of Intervention

In tracing the military intervention in North Africa, one can distinguish four potential stages.⁷ The first stage is that of a relatively apolitical, passive role of the army. The second stage is where the army discovers that it has valid

⁶Huntington, op. cit., p. 783.

⁷C. Welch, "Soldier and State in Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, V(1967), presented a three-stage model which only applied to countries with a colonial heritage. Goodspeed, op. cit., also outlines three stages, "the Preparatory Phase, the Attack Phase, and the Consolidation."

claims as an interest group and some capacity politically to achieve its demands--a stage through which the military must pass if it is to be able to overthrow the monarch. The third stage of military involvement is both an intensification of the second stage and a fuller recognition of national problems. In the final stage, the military can no longer countenance the situation as it exists and takes the political leadership by force or threat of force.

The tendency, or capacity, to move from stage #1 to stage #2 depends to some extent on the origins of the army and its traditional role within the society. Obviously, this dictates some consideration of whether the armed forces were part of a colonial establishment, how long it has been since independence,⁸ or whether the army has a long historical tradition within a continually independent nation.⁹

The type of army is another indicator of its potential for intervention. One author has classified the armies of Africa into six main types; the Raiding Citizens Army, the Palace Army, the Putsch Army, the Revolutionary Citizens Army, the Herrenvolk Army, and the Colonial Army.¹⁰ Of the six, only the Palace,

⁸Janowitz, op. cit., p. 16, says the chances of political involvement increases year by year.

⁹E. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," J. Johnson (ed.) op. cit., p. 13, points out that countries such as Ethiopia have the same kinds of problems as new states.

¹⁰P. Van Den Berghe, "The Role of the Army in Contemporary Africa," Africa Report, X(March, 1965), pp. 12-13.

Putsch and Colonial Armies have application to this study. The evolution of either the Palace Army or the Colonial Army into the Putsch Army would be an indicator that the political role was gaining in significance. "Beginning as an instrument of power of a ruling class external to it, the army becomes synonymous with the government, and the army general staff with the ruling clique."¹¹

Closely connected to the type of army is the nature of the civil-military relations which exist.¹² Morris Janowitz identifies these as; authoritarian-personal control, authoritarian-mass party, democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems, civil-military coalition, and military oligarchy.¹³ In the final two types, military involvement has clearly exceeded stage #1, while in the first three the military's involvement in domestic politics is at the minimal level. The progression is important in that in each stage the military obtains a greater awareness of other groups competing for power and loyalties. Participation in and association with the other groups can create a political identity between members of the military, particularly the officers corps.

William Gutteridge writes that "two related factors

¹¹ Ibid., p. 13.

¹² S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 96-99 indicates five types of civil-military relations depending on the general relations of power, professionalism, and ideology.

¹³ Janowitz, op. cit., p. 5.

ultimately tend to determine the role of the armed forces in other than a strictly military capacity. These are their composition, especially that of the officers corps, and their social standing and prestige in the eyes of the community at large."¹⁴ When the military begins to articulate their desires on behalf of the military as an interest group, they have advanced politically to stage #2. A major point, however, is that the propensity to move to stage #2 varies among armies considered apolitical in accordance with the differences as indicated in stage #1.

Characteristic of stage #2 are efforts to force the government to adopt certain policies; notably higher pay, pension privileges, better equipment, adjustment of the mission performed, increased size of the armed forces etc. These actions are not intended to unseat the ruling government; rather, the military works upon and through the civil authorities with "influence" and "blackmail."¹⁵ In some cases this may manifest itself in the form of mutinies which have a direct impact upon politics, but are not directly political.¹⁶

The success, or possibly even the failure, of these

¹⁴W. Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3.

¹⁵S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 86, visualizes four levels, influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment.

¹⁶Welch, op. cit., p. 312, makes this distinction as does A. Mazrui and D.S. Rothchild in their article, "The Soldier and the State in East Africa: some theoretical conclusions on the army mutinies of 1964," Western Political Quarterly, XX (March, 1967), p. 94.

efforts increases the cohesion of the military as a group and causes "the emergence of the officer corps, as part of the national elite with close connexions with the police, civil service and the politicians."¹⁷ It also makes the military aware of the "economic and human resources subject to the authority of the officers corps and its leaders."¹⁸ Resolution of the group interests of the military through political pressures invites the military to look for other just causes to which it might apply its influence.

During stage #3 attention is focused on national problems which are of consequence to the population as a whole. In the developing, modernizing countries of North Africa, problem areas are not difficult to find. Claude Welch points out that "the complexity of events belies simple, uni-causal analysis" and that "we must examine a series of factors, the salience of whose components differ from one African state to another."¹⁹ He has summarized in tabular form significant factors that helped promote military intervention;

1. The declining prestige of the major political party, as exemplified by (a) an increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance, (b) a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces, and (c) a consequent denial of effective political choice.

¹⁷W. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 67.

¹⁸Huntington, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁹Welch. op. cit., p. 313.

2. Schism among prominent politicians, weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former colonial power.
3. The lessened likelihood of external intervention in the event of military uprising.
4. 'Contagion' from seizures of control by the military in other African countries.
5. Domestic social antagonisms, most obviously manifested in countries where a minority group exercised control.
6. Economic malaise, leading to 'austerity' policies, which most effected articulate, urbanised sectors of the population.
7. Corruption and inefficiency among government and party officials, a corruption especially noticeable under conditions of economic decline.
8. A heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.²⁰

While the above are not all on the same level of analysis, they are useful in that they are typical of the national problems which lead to intervention. It is apparent that an additional category must be created to include those national problems which are unique to the individual countries.²¹

Characteristic of stage #3 is a continuance of the effort to work within the system to solve the existing problems. At the same time, the military attempts to solve the problems, increasingly on a more independent basis. The officers corps of the military, as one of the best educated elements in the country and experienced in modern methods,

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Each author expresses these motivations in different terms. For another interesting approach to the problem see S. E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 32-56.

is called upon to assist in solving the problems they decry. "Military influence is increased if members of the officers corps assume positions of authority in nonmilitary power structures."²² Failure of the government to solve the problems, or to make rapid enough progress, finally causes the military to operate outside the system and dispose the government in power. Should the military be allowed to enter stage #2 and then be restricted during stage #3, it can quickly become frustrated and move rapidly to stage #4.

Returning to our basic theme of the relationship of the military and monarchy, the king faces the dual problems of trying to solve the problems that face his country and at the same time keep the military in check. The two methods of approaching the control of the military are to either isolate the military from politics or involve the military in the political problem solving process.²³

Isolating the military can be accomplished by keeping it geographically remote from the political scene, by balancing loyalties of relatively equal strength elements of the military, or by making it a truly professional organization²⁴ and keeping it fully employed in military work. Involving the military allows military men to penetrate institutional,

²²Huntington, op. cit., p. 88.

²³Machiavelli offers detailed guidance as to how the military can be controlled in the Prince. Hobbes' Leviathan seems applicable as to the nature of traditional society.

²⁴Both Finer and Huntington conclude that professionalism retards the involvement of the military in politics.

class and constitutional politics as individuals, but attempts to deny an independent military sphere. Both methods try to prevent the military from moving to a point along the continuum where no other solution remains except the forceful take-over of the government.

Success of stage #4 is relatively independent of the size of the military establishment since the military has a monopoly on the instruments of violence. It is more important that the leadership of the sub-elements (army, navy, air-force, palace guards) are in agreement in sufficient numbers to control the preponderance of force. Additionally, the emperor must be denied alternate sources of support and influence which are capable of countering the coup group.

In addition to the military elements, the king may appeal to other power centers such as the church or nobility to rally popular support. His ability to effectively accomplish this depends both on the sources of his legitimacy, the depth of the penetration of the military into those organs, and the speed and timing with which the intervention takes place. Some legitimacy can be given to the military coup effort by substituting another royal figure at the "apex" even if it is only an interim step to full military control.

Assuming the preceding requirements have been met, the military has little to fear from the population in its quest for power. The military is generally viewed as

offering a fresh hope for the solution of the pressing problems. Known for its puritanical nature, honesty, organization, its lack of responsibility for the problems facing the country, and its problem solving, crisis oriented basis, the normal reaction will be to give it a chance.

The final decision to intervene requires both the "disposition" and the "opportunity" to intervene.²⁵ The disposition to intervene is created when the king will not or can not satisfy the grievances of the military, and the military is aware of its political capacity to act. The opportunity to intervene occurs when the monarch can no longer enforce sufficient control over the military; this may be caused by his loss of power or the military gain in power.

In summary, the preceding model is designed to provide a basis for the comparative analysis of the progressive involvement of the military in politics in North Africa. The model is, at best, an imperfect framework to which the peculiarities of the countries under analysis can be attached. While no one can predict when military takeover will take place, it should be possible to systematically determine with some degree of reliability the probability of such an occurrence. Failure to predict the likelihood of intervention that takes place normally will be caused by a lack of current information which prevents the detection of movement through

²⁵S.E. Finer, op. cit., p. 83.

the stages, or the military progresses through the stages so rapidly that the act is accomplished before analysis can begin.

Chapter 3

NORTH AFRICA

Ethiopia

Ethiopia, as a traditionally independent state, has no logical starting point for analysis of relations between the king and the military. Historically, the king relied on his leadership ability and control of a coalition of his rases, and the private armies which they brought with them, to obtain and maintain his position. A national army is a relatively recent creation of the present regime. The armies until recently, as a result, have been apolitical, geographically derived units, which do the bidding of the local ruler.

A chain of these "authority figures...hold the society together."¹ Once the authoritarian leader is lost the army has in the past fled the battlefield or deserted to the enemy. The military has, however, a historical role in "settling questions in relation to succession."² This was the legacy that Haile Selassie inherited.

Haile Selassie is a master of the system of balancing of forces and the intricacies of palace intrigue; indeed, it

¹C. Clapham, Haile-Selassie's Government (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 6.

²A. Castagno, "Ethiopia: Reshaping an Autocracy," Africa Report, VIII(October, 1963), p. 5.

was the basis of his rise to power.³ At the same time, he was well aware that an emperor would never really control his country until he had a national army under his direct command. Prior to World War II, Haile Selassie had gained control over the army after the Minister of War died in 1926, insured this control in writing in the Constitution of 1931, and took steps to modernize the elements of force, including the purchase of several airplanes. The effects of WWII on nobility, however, allowed him to train a professional army, under his command, replacing the feudal levies and private armies of pre-war days. The growth of the national military establishment and Haile Selassie's decisions affecting its use and control are best considered as beginning in the Post-War period. At the same time, much of the tradition and character of historic forces remains.

The period from the end of World War II until 1960 is one where the army (and the other elements of force) remained generally apolitical and within the boundaries of stage #1.⁴ The starting point in terms of civil-military relations, type of army and its political awareness as a group were so close to the beginning of the continuum that the emperor was very successful in isolating the elements of force.

³L. Mosley, Haile Selassie: The Conquering Lion (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), is one of the best descriptions of his rise to power.

⁴The coups of 1947 and 1951 were palace intrigues with no apparent wide-spread support in the military.

Haile Selassie's "personal-authoritarian" regime has controlled the military through organization and leadership techniques, which while not new, are seldom so well executed. Central to this effort is the prevention of meaningful centers of authority from developing which might challenge the throne; the prevention of "the growth of a military hierarchy loyal to internal norms."⁵

Organization of the Palace Guard, the Army and a series of less potent military elements (air force, navy, several different police forces) which have no unified command or loyalty to higher command except the emperor, facilitates this effort. The presence of both the "Palace Army" and the "National Army" have inhibited the development of the "Putsch Army." Operations are normally on a small scale so as not to develop the coordination, professionalization and politicization necessary for a coup effort. Stationing the National Army on the edge of the capital makes it physically available to counter the Palace Army, but not close enough so as to facilitate the plotting of a conspiracy.

Encouragement is given to these divisions through selection and appointment of military leadership and by manipulation of the leaderships access to the throne. Selection of men for the top jobs who are natural enemies

⁵C. Clapham, "Imperial Leadership in Ethiopia," African Affairs, 68 (April, 1969), p. 117.

(whether because of personal makeup, previous events, place of origin etc.) allowed the emperor to significantly lessen the possibility that they might act in consort. By giving senior officers (and sometimes junior officers) personal access to the throne on an informal contact basis, he insured a steady flow of information gained by the competing intelligence systems. Thus, competing for favor was one way of getting special privilege.

Other experienced leaders "have been 'tamed' by bringing them into the government and allowing them to enjoy the spoils of office at the price of subordination to the Emperor."⁶ The Patriots were closely connected with the nobility, as leaders of the wartime resistance had gained great prestige, and they had built up military followings loyal to themselves and independent of the emperor. This threat was eliminated by giving key members of the Patriots jobs in Addis Ababa so as to cut them off from their local bases of support. The appointment of Ras Ababa Aragay as Minister of War is probably the best known case. If the natural leader is kept from his source of support long enough he eventually dies or his support evaporates through natural attrition.

Appearances of loyalty and subordination are not enough in a society whose nature is one of mistrust. As a

⁶Ibid., p. 117.

result, a few years after the liberation a system was established whereby all military messages can be decoded within the palace.⁷ This, plus several competing intelligence systems, makes it virtually impossible to organize against the emperor except on the smallest and most personal scale.

Nor is the emperor content to rely on leadership tactics and intelligence to control the military. He has carefully fulfilled his traditional military role, such as leading the troops into battle in World War II. The necessary legal veneer was carefully added to the 1931 and 1955 Constitutions to insure his personal control over the armed forces. As the unquestioned leader of the military he has steadily modernized the forces with equipment and training. While not modern in terms of organization and equipment of western armies, the modernization was sufficient to retard the development of the military as an interest group for the purposes of improving its conditions, equipment, pay etc. At the same time, the military was not improved to a point where its social standing and prestige in the eyes of the community might challenge that of the emperor.

The political role of the army changed little between the end of World War II and 1960. Starting very near the beginning of the continuum, it had progressed little. The elements that create political awareness had carefully been

⁷C. Clapham, Haile-Selassie's Government, op. cit., p. 54.

kept in check. The disposition and mood to participate had not crystalized. The Coup d'Etat of December, 1960, served as the single most important event in the alteration of the relations between the military and the monarchy during the fifty year reign of Haile Selassie.

Professor Castagno says "the abortive coup d'etat of December 1960 brought into the open for the first time the dissatisfaction that had been previously expressed only cautiously--an then often quickly denied."⁸ The source of the discontent, the organization and failure of the coup and the roles of the elements of the armed forces, provides a clearer understanding of the stages of the continuum as they apply to Ethiopia.

The coup attempt was organized around the leadership of two brothers, Brigadier General Mangestu Neway, the Commander of the Imperial Body Guard, and Germame Neway, a subprovincial governor who was mainly responsible for the planning and political motivation behind the coup. To be successful in the coup they had to fulfill three requirements:

1. They must assemble a preponderance of military support.
2. They must provide strong reasons for the coup so as to neutralize sources of political power available to the king, and
3. The coup must be completed rapidly and consolidated before a counter force could be organized.

⁸Castagno, op. cit., p. 5.

Organization of the coup required limited participation because of the requirements to maintain secrecy. As a result, the brothers were joined by the Chief of Security, Colonel Warqenah Gabayahu, the Police Commissioner, Brigadier General Tsége, a few educated radicals, and most of the Imperial Bodyguard. The rebels failed to neutralize Dajazmach Arrata Kasa, an influential nobleman, and the Chief of Staff, Major General Merid Mangasha. Apparently, an ambiguous reply that Merid had made to a telephone call had "led Mengistu to assume-- mistakenly as it turned out--that Merid would support an attempted coup."⁹

The coup participants further assumed "that military, air force and police officers below the rank of colonel and major would all support the movement; that ordinary soldiers and NCOs would obey orders and need not be informed."¹⁰ This was a false assumption in that the leadership of the other military elements had not been neutralized and in forming a counter-coup group retained the loyalty of their subordinates for the most part. Additionally, as Greenfield points out, the average soldier was prepared to fight for "My King, my Church and my Country, in that order."¹¹ The result was that "the assumption that, once they had struck the first blow,

⁹R. Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 378.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 387.

others would join in,"¹² was not true.

The coup group might still have been successful if they could have rallied the pro-coup elements of the military such as army detachments in Harar or the undecided groups such as the Military Academy and portions of the army. Increasing the base of support with these groups and or attacking the counter-coup group at the 1st Division headquarters could have turned the tide. Because the coup group did not do the above things the counter-coup group was able to quickly organize military support for the king.

As a result of the counter-coup group's efforts and acting on Merid's orders, "air force transports flew about forty-four trips to airlift nearly a thousand troops"¹³ from a number of locations to the air force base at Debra Zeyt, some thirty-five miles south of the capital. These forces joined with "a task force of five carriers and jeeps"¹⁴ and advanced on Addis Ababa. This support, along with that of the air force, eliminated Merid's initial fear of insufficient troops and justified his belief that "he could not lose."¹⁵ The coup was doomed because the bulk of the military elements supported the king.

¹²C. Clapham, "The Ethiopian Coup d'Etat of December 1960," The Journal of Modern African Studies, VI(December, 1968), p. 501.

¹³Greenfield, op. cit., p. 413.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 410.

The second necessity was to provide a strong rationale to justify the coup so as to neutralize supporters of the king such as the church, nobility, and the portions of the armed forces which could not be brought into active support. Issues such as previously indicated in stage #3 of the continuum were clearly present. They were outlined in the Revolutionary Proclamation which the Crown Prince, a coup participant, read to the nation. The emphasis of the proclamation was on things that were obviously true such as the plight of the people from "ignorance, illiteracy and poverty," and an emphasis on the stagnation of Ethiopia in comparison to the new nations of Africa which were "achieving so great a rate of progress that they are leaving Ethiopia far behind in economic development, education and living standards."¹⁶

Shortly after the initial proclamation the policies of the new government were announced. Among the eleven points of this proclamation were specific appeals and promises which were directed at virtually all sectors of Ethiopian society. Point nine was directed at the military in hopes of rallying the armed forces to its cause.

9. Members of the armed forces will have more clearly defined privileges and personal freedom and hereafter the armed forces will not be known under two separate titles, namely Imperial Bodyguard and the Imperial Ethiopian Armed Forces. In the future there will only be one name The Ethiopian Army.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 388-9.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 403.

When these generalized promises were not successful and in a final attempt to rally the allegiance of the military before the fighting broke out, the "Council of the Revolution had announced a wage increment for the armed forces."¹⁸ Merid, in response, offered the military an even greater increase. This effort secured the loyalty of the armed forces, but was to have a more lasting impact.

Greenfield and Clapham both stress the other fundamental weaknesses in the failure to appeal to religion as a basis of the coup and the failure to eliminate the king. Failure to appeal to the church allowed the Patriarch to not only support the king with his wide influence, but to put out leaflets ex-communicating the rebels from the church. Failure to eliminate the king allowed the strong authoritarian personage of Haile Selassie to return to Ethiopia and rally the people and groups that had a strong personal commitment to the emperor for their positions.

The final requirement of swift completion of the coup did not materialize because of the small base of support, poor organization, and generally weak execution of the coup. Failure to "disconnect the telephone system"¹⁹ rapidly enough allowed the word to get to those who organized the counter-coup. Failure to silence all radio transmitters allowed the word to get to Haile Selassie, spurring his

¹⁸Ibid., p. 446.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 394.

return, and to foreign countries which declared their support for the king. The passage of time allowed the counter-coup group to disprove the Crown Prince's statement in the Proclamation that the "new Ethiopian government formed by me, and supported by the armed forces, the police, the younger educated Ethiopians and by the whole Ethiopian people."²⁰

Thus, in whatever way you view the coup, the short-range results must be considered a failure. Correlation of the previous discussion with the model provides a critical transition point from the events prior to 1960 and those which have followed. In terms of the model, the coup failed because the participants attempted to pass from stage #1 of the model to stage #4 without first passing through, at least briefly, stages #2 and #3. By failing to pass along the continuum the political consciousness and political awareness of the military elements had not been nurtured. Thus, appeals to the military as an interest group through the pay promises and through appeals on national grounds did not meet a sufficiently receptive audience. Ultimately, the ideas projected in the coup and the coup itself were to provide the basis for moving the military into stage #2, but by this time the coup had failed. The movement of the military along the continuum is the story of the post-coup period.

The crisis atmosphere in Addis Ababa which had been

²⁰Ibid., p. 399.

dissipated with the defeat of the coup was rekindled in March, 1961, with the trial of Mengistu. Fear of violence which might result from the announcement of the verdict caused a large number of troops to be in the capital. Presence of the assembled force crystalized the military as an interest group; the catalyst was the promises that had been made, in the heat of the coup crisis, of a pay raise.

"Mounting military pressure did lead to salary increments for police and army personnel up to the rank of colonel, to cost E\$4,606,520 (approximately US \$1,850,000) effective from March 10, 1961."²¹ Being considerably below the level of the promises, the emperor was disposed to justify the reduced amounts on the basis of the economic problems of the country. An appeal to the loyalty and faithfulness of the army and police was designed to gain support for the reduced amount.

"However, the troops were not satisfied, especially the non-commissioned officers and soldiers."²² While the pay issue was the immediate manifestation of the demands, the military were apparently increasingly subjected to criticism by the common man for their role. The issues of national importance had been re-thought. The truth of the matters was so apparent that a campaign in the form of "increase in

²¹Ibid., p. 446.

²²Ibid.

scandalous gossip about the dynasty...anti-government pamphlets...communications were sent to the generals... chiding the generals over the alleged oppressive nature of the Ethiopian government...threatening phone calls"²³ to generals which they discovered emanated from their own headquarters. There was developing what Clapham says "marked a new willingness to challenge the regime violently," and the "formulation of myths which could not long have survived success"²⁴ but grew on failure. There were in effect the growing conditions for the movement of the military into stage #3 of the continuum.

The protests that followed culminated in a march on the palace and a forty-eight hour ultimatum demanding a further increase in salary. The result was an increase in pay for all soldiers of E\$16 a month at the expense of younger Ethiopian government officials who absorbed the cost of the raise in the form of a pay cut. More important, however, it forced Haile Selassie to institute measures and controls to prevent the military from moving further along the continuum.

Reforms which were instituted have been deemed "New Wine, old bottle,"²⁵ by one source and "unlikely that the Emperor, whatever his intentions, will ever convince his

²³Ibid., pp. 446-447.

²⁴Clapham, "The Ethiopian Coup d'Etat of December 1960," op. cit., p. 506.

²⁵"New wine, old bottle," The Economist, December 18, 1965.

critics that genuine reform is his goal"²⁶ by another. Greenfield says "changes of a fundamental nature have yet to occur."²⁷ The reforms proposed included more autonomy in provincial administration and more effective land reform, the appointment of more trained civil servants, reorganization of the civil service etc.²⁸

More important though are the steps taken to mollify the military establishment and reinstitute the balance of military elements which existed prior to the coup. This goal was accomplished by a number of methods. First, changes were made in the top leadership of the military elements to make the leaders more dependent on the king. Second, new territorial army units were established in each of the provinces to balance the concentration of force in Addis Ababa. Third, units that had been faithful were rewarded and those that had waived were penalized.

Rewards were in the form of increases in size, improvement in equipment, and a greater expenditure of the budget on military projects. The budget of 1965-1966, for instance, spent 100 million of the 182 million Ethiopian dollars appropriated on defense.²⁹ The Air Force obtained a wide

²⁶Castagno, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁷Greenfield, op. cit., p. 453.

²⁸Castagno, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁹"New wine, old bottle," op. cit., p. 1306.

variety of modern aircraft. In contrast, Indian officers were invited to retrain the mutinous Imperial Bodyguard and they also staffed the Military Academy at Harar.³⁰ Other actions that have taken place include "recent mass promotions of Warrant officers and NCOS to junior commissioned rank" which has "been widely interpreted as an attempt by Court circles to weaken the solidarity of the younger service officers."³¹

Despite the steps taken, the military seems to have continued to increase in influence. The ability to enforce a demand for another pay increase in 1964 and the tendency to retire army officers to positions of potential influence, such as the Senate,³² would tend to support this view. In Ethiopia today "...the military are objects of the highest admiration and appreciation" and their "assumption of greater responsibility for national development by the military would not be regarded by the public as an unpleasant prospect."³³

Even though the military seemingly has established a strong position in politics, Haile Selassie does not appear to be in any immediate danger. An article in the U.S. News & World Report cuts to the heart of why the military does not arrive at the end of the continuum at the present time

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Greenfield, op. cit., p. 456.

³²Clapham, Haile-Selassie's Government, op. cit., p. 149.

³³D. Levine, "The Military in Ethiopian Politics: Capabilities and Constraints," H. Bienen(ed.) The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 24.

Can the authority of one man keep a country together? That is the story of Ethiopia--so far. But now Emperor Haile Selassie, back from a visit to Washington, finds his country rebellious and troublesome, shaky, and poor after 200 million dollars' worth of U.S. aid. Student disorders have shut down most schools. Unemployment is high. Militant Moslems, backed by Chinese Reds, rebel in the North. Crown Prince is rated weak. In Ethiopia, an ancient nation, odds are for big trouble--soon.³⁴

The authority of one man will keep the country together because the influence of tradition, particularly on the lower ranks of the military is very strong, the balance and controls on the military have been reestablished and the military pacified as its lack of mention in the above commentary might indicate.

But, the conditions of stage #3 of the model are still present and the possibilities of them being removed within the limits of the present system and without force does not appear possible. Haile Selassie is an old man, however, and his death and the succession crisis which will probably follow will be the most critical test as to the degree of the politicization of the military.

Loss of the apex in a system that has depended on the single, supreme authoritarian figure for such a lengthy period is likely to have devastating results. The continuing failure to designate openly a successor as authorized by the Constitution prevents the growth and development of the leader-

³⁴U.S. News & World Report, LXVII(July 21, 1969), p. 46.

ship characteristics and legitimacy symbols which would be essential for an orderly succession. Even if one is to believe that "nobody now seriously disputes that the throne will pass, on the emperor's death to his son...crown prince, Asfa Wossen,"³⁵ one must doubt his strength of character and ability to assume the management of the Ethiopian government. This role will be further complicated by the fact that the crown prince was a participant in the 1960 Coup.

Without doubt, the other major political forces such as the new intelligentsia, the Church, the traditional aristocracy etc. will present a challenge to the military which will have to be resolved. The military, it is clear, will not be able to accept after succession the political role to which it is currently relegated. "The suppression of the December, 1960, coup by the Army has given its leaders an increased sense of power and responsibility for the continuity of Ethiopian politics, and impressed upon the public the importance of the Army in calculations about Ethiopia's political future."³⁶ Its probability of flowing into the power vacuum is high because of its monopoly of the instruments of force, particularly if it can produce a 'Nassar' type leader who can unite its sub-elements.

In summary, the military and the monarch have reached

³⁵"After the Lion," the Economist, February 6, 1965, p. 522.

³⁶Levine, op. cit., p. 32.

a point of balance in their political sub-system; resulting in the progression along the continuum stabilizing in stage #3. This has resulted from a combination of the "controls" Haile Selassie has placed on the military and the satisfaction of many of their "demands" on the political system. This situation can continue because the military is willing to sacrifice some immediate political gains because of the ease with which they will be able to control the system upon the death of Haile Selassie.

Several possible actions could cause the military to take action prior to Haile Selassie's death. Should Haile Selassie attempt to alter the system in some way that would have a significant negative affect on the military, they might be provoked into action. Or should the "environment" change through a drastic increase in unsolvable problems such as a war, the military might take over control. Finally, the most likely involvement of the military would be through some other power center trying to capture the system prior to Haile Selassie's death. The reaction to such a threat could easily result in the king being reduced from a ruling to a reigning monarch.

Morocco

Morocco, like Ethiopia, has a long traditional relationship between the king and the military which continues to influence their actions. Historically, the Islamic king is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces; a role derived from the religious sanction conferred upon

him as calif, commander of the believers. "The important addition which Moroccan history brought to the Islamic heritage was that the military force of the Makhzen was a personal adjunct of the sultan."³⁷ The Sultan, as did the King in Ethiopia, declared war and led his troops into battle.

The soldiers normally were Berber tribesman who "have long enjoyed a reputation as good soldiers. Warfare is considered an honorable profession, and militarymen have enjoyed high prestige throughout the country's history."³⁸ The independent nature of the Berber resulted in the traditional distinction between bled as-siba (country) and bled al-makhzen (city); yet, even in the siba the personal loyalty to the king remained. The end product of good, loyal soldiers and the traditional role of the king resulted in a direct personal relationship between the two elements.

This personal relationship was, if not completely disrupted, at least severely limited by the Protectorate which occupied Morocco with a French army of 85,000 men garrisoned at strategic points in the French zone and a 60,000 man Spanish army stationed in the northern zone. Included in these armies were over 30,000 Moroccans, organized as special units.³⁹ The relationship was reestablished, to a degree, during the exile of the king. The king became

³⁷I.W. Zartman, Destiny of a Dynasty (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Company, 1964), p. 32.

³⁸American University, Area Handbook for Morocco (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 418.

³⁹Ibid. p. 409.

the symbol of the resistance and an Army of Liberation(AOL) fought in his name to liberate the country.

Independence, as in Ethiopia, thus found a changed set of circumstances and problems which provided the opportunity for the monarchy to make decisions which could later alter the historic relationship with the military. Thus, the organization, use, and control of the military after independence is an acceptable starting point for the understanding of the military's position within the continuum. It is also appropriate to consider Moulay Hassan's role in decisions regarding the military as continuous; first as Chief of Staff of the Army(his father remained the Commander in Chief) and later as both Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief(after Mohammed V's death). Thus, the cases of Hassan II and Haile Selassie are somewhat analagous as decision makers operating in highly traditional systems, who because of events were given an opportunity to alter the basis of control of the military.

Morris Janowitz describes Morocco as a "semicompetitive" system in which the role of the military is restricted "in part because colonial traditions implanted a strong sense of self-restraint on the military."⁴⁰ The system, however, does permit a degree of political competition, participation and awareness which were not present in Ethiopia.

In spite of having gained independence on March 3,

⁴⁰ Janowitz, op. cit., p. 6.

1956, Morocco was still under foreign occupation. The rapid creation of an armed force was needed as a mark of sovereignty, a symbol of independence, and as a pressure to speed the departure of the foreign troops. Two organized forces existed: The Army of Liberation(AOL), an essentially civilian body of guerrilla fighters who had played an important part during the war of independence, and the Moroccan elements of the French and Spanish forces.

Two important considerations were involved in the decision to use the Moroccan elements of the French Army as the initial force; one consideration professional and the other political. Use of the French force provided a force organized and trained in modern methods to immediately control the situation. Ashford points out that "in the first parade of the Royal Army were 500 French noncommissioned officers and an estimated \$3,000,000 worth of French equipment."⁴¹ The Army of Liberation could have provided sufficient manpower in terms of numbers, but not with comparable training and discipline.

The second consideration, political, was of greater importance because of the political fight for the control of the army. The Army of Liberation had in its organization a political orientation to purposes other than independence and the King's return. They "were sworn into the irregular army to die on behalf of independence for all North Africa."⁴²

⁴¹D. Ashford, Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 177.

⁴²Ibid., p. 169.

Leadership of the AOL had greater potential, however, since the officers in the French force were Frenchmen who could not become a permanent part of the Royal Army. Leadership of the AOL was increasingly subject to penetration by party leaders such as Al-Fassi who viewed the AOL as the instrument of his irredentist claims.⁴³

Lack of Moroccan commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the French element required an intensive initial training program. Far from a disadvantage, it allowed the king to select and train officers whose loyalty would be unquestioned. The soldiers in both the AOL and the transferred French units generally came from Berber tribes and could be considered apolitical and loyal to the king as long as their leaders remained loyal. The wisdom in this choice and the efforts of the Istiqlal to gain control of the AOL were reflected in Balagrej's remarks to the secretaries' conference of the Istiqlal in 1958, when he specifically referred to the police and the army as the crucial areas of government operations over which his government had lacked control.⁴⁴

The next major decision to be made was the question of controls. How would the new Moroccan armed force be controlled? How would the AOL and Spanish element be controlled? The first problem was solved by centralizing

⁴³Ibid., p. 167.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 166. See pages 163-184 for a general discussion of the Police and the AOL.

the control of the armed forces and the police under the direct supervision of the palace; essentially creating a large palace army. The King became the Commander-in-Chief and his son, Prince Moulay Hassan, became the Chief of Staff. A close friend of the King became the first Minister of Defense. The order creating the Army clearly showed that the army was "placed under Our direct authority" and would participate "as we determine in the maintenance of public order."⁴⁵

Centralization was further instituted by placing the small air force, that was established in 1956, and the navy created in 1960 subordinate to the army.⁴⁶ This was both a practical measure because of the small size of these units and a political measure to prevent the growth of elite organizations. The police, on the other hand, remained independent and reported directly to the king.

The problem of the Spanish element and the AOL was solved by integrating these forces into the already established units. In the case of the AOL this was done with difficulty, requiring isolating the unit geographically first, and eventually a visit from the king to establish complete compliance. The method of integrating the AOL served as an additional control measure. About 6,000 tribesmen were

⁴⁵As quoted by Ashford, Ibid., p. 180.

⁴⁶American University, op. cit., p. 410.

integrated into the Royal Army, 3,000 into the government, mostly the police force, and 3,000 joined the Sahara Liberation Army.⁴⁷ Division of the AOL between the various groups, and on a geographical basis, reduced the possibility of the AOL becoming a coordinated political force.

Thus, in terms of the continuum, the military forces of Morocco must be considered initially as apolitical and highly loyal. Organization and controls which were established created an officer corps without a political orientation (except to the king) and a force with an image as a professional force, rather than a heroic image. The use of the armed forces in operations would determine whether it would acquire a disposition for politics.

The two features which distinguish the use of the Moroccan army are its total involvement in the problems of the country and the role of the Prince. In attempting to make the "FAR an element of stability in the nation"⁴⁸ the Army was assigned missions of external defense, internal security, and a mission of social work.⁴⁹

The period following independence was a turbulent one in which the army was first a counterbalance to the potential of the AOL, performed its internal security role in the Meknes riots of October 1956, served as a show of force in the

⁴⁷Ashford, op. cit., p. 176.

⁴⁸I.W. Zartman, Problems of New Power Morocco (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 114. FAR stands for Royal Armed Forces.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 77.

Tafilalt, faced the Spanish in the external role at Tarrava, and in the winter of 1958-1959, put down the Rif dissidence. Each of the operations was characterized by mistakes which were corrected in the succeeding operations, leading to a growing professionalism. Professionalism was reinforced by the general restraint which was displayed in the limitation of force employed, the emphasis on persuasion and defensive measures, and the social work which accompanied each action.

In the Tafilalt, for instance, the army Engineer Battalion and other army units helped avert famine by reconstruction of the irrigation system. They aided in work on the Unity Road, Operation Flow, Operation Tree, annual anti-locust campaigns in the Sahara, anti-illiteracy campaigns, aided the Ministry of Health, Public Works, of National Education, and of Agriculture and the National Community Chest. The largest army operation in fulfillment of the social mission was the occupation of Agadir after the earthquake of 1960.⁵⁰ In each case, the army was involved in solving problems of a social nature which were only indirectly related to military operations.

The role of the prince was particularly important in the early years of independence because of the limited supply of capable military leadership, and because it established the precedent for his later military relationship. Personal command of the forces as Chief-of-Staff, and as

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 94-96 provides a detailed discussion.

Commander-in-Chief(in the Tafilalt) in the absence of his father is the best description of his role. While this direct command was not always continuous, he always reasserted his control of military matters and took personal command of operations at critical points in the action, such as in the Rif.

The prince also served as an innovator in involving the military in social work "in individual operations and to incorporate it into the concept of the army as an element of royal--and princely--power. For the social mission was a means of associating the military in the work of the nation; it was an attempt to overcome criticism directed against the army from activist and 'popular quarters' and to smooth over any bad feelings left by the army after its internal security operations."⁵¹ The prince, then, must be considered the major decision-maker in military matters, innovator in use of the forces, and personal military commander, to whom military men owe loyalty not only on a royal basis, but on the basis of shared experience in operations.

The best test of this loyalty, and of the degree of politicization of the military, can be observed in times of crisis, such as the period following the death of Mohammed V and the coup attempts of 1963 and 1971.

Hassan II was able to become King of Morocco with no

⁵¹Ibid., p. 94.

threat of military interference. This was possible because he immediately showed that he would continue his father's efforts at "fusion of traditional ways with modern aims and techniques without however envisaging the undue subordination of the former to the latter."⁵² By demonstrating his adherence to the traditional ways, particularly religious symbols, he insured the support of the lower ranks who generally are more traditionally oriented. By supporting the other half of the policy, modernization, he received the support of the elements of the armed forces most affected by modern equipment and techniques.

Additionally, Moulay Hassan had been popular with the army and the army followed him because those were the king's orders. "When the prince became the king, the army followed him because it knew him, because he was the king, and because his views of government echoed the army's own non-partisan but very political thinking."⁵³

The coup effort of July, 1963, was engineered by the UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces) and resulted in the arrest of a large number of the members of its militant faction. Stuart Schaar writes that "perhaps the most significant but little publicized aspect of the entire 1963 plot affair was

⁵²R. Landau, Hassan II King of Morocco (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 32. This book is one of the best accounts of the changeover period.

⁵³Zartman, Problems of New Power Morocco, op. cit., p. 115.

the role of the military."⁵⁴

Although it is very difficult to check some of the facts "there were clear indications that Army officers above the rank of lieutenant were implicated in the plot."⁵⁵ The results were at least four of these officers disappeared from public view, about a dozen others were transferred from positions of responsibility to Rabat, the Air Force hierarchy was shaken up and since then the army has received "impressive salary increases, placing them well beyond the salary range of their peers."⁵⁶

While the process is less clear in this case, than in Ethiopia, it appears that the coup attempt created an increased political awareness within the military. Disloyal elements were subjected to new controls and loyal elements were rewarded with a pay raise. This would seem to indicate that the army had entered stage #2 of the model. Events which have followed the coup attempt, would tend to confirm this assumption.

Notable in this development is the increased importance of the army. Since 1964, army officers have filled one or two ministries as well as half the provincial governorships. The army played a hero's role in the Algerian War, and has been brought into greater prominence as a result of the frequent suspicion of plots, as well as the fear of another conflict with Algeria. The officers, in turn, tend to scorn the civilian government and parties for muffing diplomatic opportunities after the Algerian War and for making increased security measures necessary. While it is too early to say that there is a military-based regime, or that the military has become a political organization in its

⁵⁴S. Schaar, "Hassans Morocco," Africa Report, X (June, 1965), p. 10.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

own right, or even that it is the client group of the Minister of Interior, it is certain that the army has moved from an apolitical to simply a non-partisan position. With increased importance comes an increased awareness of its own interests--in terms of pay, equipment, activity.⁵⁷

Several other plots were rumored to have been discovered before they could be implemented, during the period 1964-1971. On July 11, 1971, the King's 42nd birthday, a coup attempt was conducted by "regular army officers and cadets from a military school led by the commander of Hassan's personal military staff."⁵⁸ Among the leaders of the coup were ten senior officers, including four generals. "Most of the ringleaders were millionaire aristocrats and belonged to the families of tribal leaders in the Rif mountains of northeastern Morocco."⁵⁹

The coup attempt consisted primarily of an assault on the palace by 1,400 noncommissioned officer cadets under the leadership of the head of the military academy. While reports differ, it seems likely that the cadets were duped into thinking they were going to the rescue of the king who was being held prisoner in the palace as a part of a leftist coup. The coup collapsed when one of the king's captors

⁵⁷I.W. Zartman, "Political Pluralism in Morocco," Government and Opposition, II(July, 1967), p. 580.

⁵⁸"Morocco: The Coup that Failed," Newsweek, July 19, 1971, p. 8.

⁵⁹"Coup Attempt in Morocco Seen Rightist," International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1971, p. 2.

"suddenly stood at attention, saluted and kissed the king's hand. Then all the attackers put down their weapons and started to shout...long live the king."⁶⁰ The arrival of massive reinforcements under the command of Gen Mohammed Oufkir brought the coup attempt to an end.

Objectives of the coup apparently were to set up a military dictatorship, perhaps on the Greek model, and to safeguard some of the ancient privileges of the feudal aristocracy.⁶¹ Because the coup was a failure the true reasons may never be known. It is clear, however, that even though the King had attempted to improve the economy, increase education, etc. he had created a lot of enemies through many other actions.

Among these actions were the suspension of the constitution in 1965, repression such as the kidnapping and presumably murder of opposition leader Ben Barka in 1965, and the trial of 193 critics of the regime on dubious charges of a plot to murder the King in June, 1971. Perhaps more directly relevant to the military were his policies of maintaining close ties with the United States and his refusal to aid Arab states in the 1967 war with Israel; such factors have meaning in terms of the AOL element that had sworn an oath to the pan-Arab movement. Libya and Egypt both supported the coup attempt; the Egyptian press said the problem was that Hassan "still believes

⁶⁰"Moroccan Coup Attempt Fails in Bloody Shooting," International Herald Tribune, July 12, 1971, p. 2.

⁶¹"Coup Attempt in Morocco Seen Rightist," op. cit., p. 2.

that he rules by divine right."⁶²

The results of the coup present somewhat of a dilemma in the relationship between monarch and military. First, it is evident that "Hassan now knows that he can never be sure of the military's full loyalty again."⁶³ Yet to insure this loyalty it has been "his decision to give wide-ranging powers to Morocco's ruthlessly authoritarian Interior Minister, Gen Mohammed Oufkir" a step which "virtually assured a step-up of repression in the country."⁶⁴ Increased repression will create additional dissatisfaction which if the cycle is repeated often enough will result in a growing political strength for the leadership of the military.

At this point, the regime is safe, because the military already has an important stake in the system (the majority of the 45,000 man army remained loyal); they would gain little as a group by going outside the system. The problems of the country are, in their view, caused by groups other than the king, such as the political parties. The army has already been given a role in solving the social problems and does not need to pursue the issue as a force independent of the king. The civil function is being fulfilled; and, as compared to Ethiopia, economic and other considerations are much

⁶²"Heikal, Cairo Editor, Condemns King Hassan," International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1971, p. 1.

⁶³"Morocco: The Coup that Failed," op. cit., p. 8.

⁶⁴Ibid.

more developed.⁶⁵

Finally, it is necessary to strongly reemphasize the close personal relationship between monarch and military and the controls which the monarch has placed on the military. Not the least of these controls is the traditional role of the military as the personal force of the king; and as Ashford writes, "the traditional power of the monarchy has, if anything, been reinforced over the past four years."⁶⁶

While some authors visualize certain circumstances wherein the military might take-over the government,⁶⁷ that probability does not seem imminent. The most likely point of challenge would seem to be when the original military leadership(now fifteen years) has passed from the scene, when another attempted coup occurs and army support allows increased demands to be made on the king, or a further pluralization of political parties occurs so that a political vacuum exists wherein king and military become open competitors and interest-aggregating and problem solving centers.

Libya

Henry Villard points out that "the story of Libya is

⁶⁵G. Almond and J. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 580-581. If anything, the gap has increased since the 1960 figures.

⁶⁶D. Ashford, "The politics of Rural Mobilisation in North Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, VII (July, 1969), p. 194.

⁶⁷Zartman, "Destiny of a Dynasty," op. cit., pp. 91-93 and S. Schaar, "King Hassan's Alternatives," Africa Report, VIII(August, 1963), p. 12.

essentially a story of conquest and occupation."⁶⁸ The successive occupations by Carthage, Rome, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Normans, the Spaniards, the Turks, the Italians, and finally the victorious British⁶⁹ provided virtually no opportunity for the development of an independent military tradition. Monarchy, another young institution in Libya, has closely paralleled the personality and capabilities of King Idris. The historic development of the relationship between monarch and military demonstrates why it was never a strong one.

Idris became king because he was virtually the only person in Libya who could unite the disparate provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. As grandson of the founder of the Sanussi Order, Idris provided a source of legitimacy which while strongest in Cyrenaica was accepted throughout the country. His efforts in resistance to the Italians (from exile) during WWI had gained him respect as a statesman and the title of Emir. During WWII Idris's role as a resistance leader was clearer in the military sense for "in 1940 Sayid Idris then in exile, offered his services to the British and formed the Libyan Arab Forces."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ H. Villard, Libya: The New Arab Kingdom of North Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 11.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Libya: A Brief Political and Economic Survey (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 2. Also see M. Khadduri, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 29 for an account of the Libyan forces.

When independence came, however, on December 24, 1951, it was not because of military efforts, but because of a lack of consensus in the United Nations. Unlike Haile Selassie, Idris did not return to Libya to help liberate his country. He preferred to remain in exile during the war, reluctantly returning only after he had been proclaimed king. Thus, no close personal relationship was established between military and monarchy as in Morocco, nor did Idris fulfill a traditional role as did Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. Idris was anxious to create a Libyan army as soon as possible, however, declaring that "this is the dearest wish of our heart."⁷¹

The primitive economic development and geographic separation of the country and the general fragmented nature of its society makes Libya similar to Ethiopia in these respects. Idris did not provide a synthesis for the factions through strong leadership

The distinctive feature of the absolutist system was its isolation from the society at large... A second notable feature was the physical remoteness and detachment of the king, who preferred to remain in Cyrenaica isolated from the daily pressures of government... A third, and perhaps critical, feature of the absolutist system was its lack of viability. The King had produced no male issue, and the question of succession was slightly clouded.⁷²

⁷¹as quoted by Villard, op. cit., p. 50.

⁷²W.H. Lewis, "Libya: The End of Monarchy," Current History, 58(January, 1970), p. 35.

While no means of developing supports materializes in such a situation it is also difficult to develop opposition or make demands on the system. Since the need was small and the country poor, Idris was able to rely on a small "Palace Army" of 3,000 troops, organized into three battalions.⁷³ Significantly, the police force has consistently remained twice the size of the army.⁷⁴ The "government continues its policy of keeping the army widely dispersed, short of weapons and short of men. The police force larger and stronger, and has a pampered position which keeps it loyal."⁷⁵ Additionally, "policing is a prestigious occupation, and the army's greatest importance is probably as a source of national pride."⁷⁶ Cyrenaican forces are kept larger than those of the other two provinces, maximizing the support of the Sanussi followers.

Lack of use of the armed forces further limited its development. "Only in education had King Idris' government done a good job--and that may have backfired."⁷⁷ As in the

⁷³Libya: A Brief Political and Economic Survey, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷⁴At the time of the coup there was a "more than 6,000-man British-trained Cyrenaican militia" and "the national police force, which is almost twice the size of the 10,000-man Libyan army." "Textbook Coup in a Desert Kingdom," Time, 94(September 12, 1969), p. 34.

⁷⁵"Where have all the rebels gone?," Economist, 221 (November 5, 1966), p. 573.

⁷⁶I.W. Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 99.

⁷⁷"Textbook Coup in a Desert Kingdom," op. cit., p. 34.

civilian community, education in the military was substantial. Western advisers and equipment⁷⁸ and study in the United States and Great Britain provided intellectual development and training for members of the military (particularly younger officers).

In terms of the model, Libya clearly falls within the early portion of stage #1 during the early post-independence period. Between 1951-1959 little occurred to cause a change in the relationship between King Idris and the military. Only the previously mentioned expanded horizons of the educated young provided any departure from the traditional way of life.

Discovery of oil in 1959 became the catalyst which has served to alter the Libyan way of life.⁷⁹ The discovery of vast oil fields gave Libya a second valuable resource to augment that of her strategic location. It also created the potential for great wealth for those in a position to capitalize on it. It also created "the disadvantages that tend to follow from sudden and fortuitous acquisition of great wealth. The constantly rising cost of living falls hard on those who are not in a position to cash in."⁸⁰ Among those not in a position to cash in were the military.

A multitude of social, economic and political problems unfolded, causing "the gulf between the traditional ruling

⁷⁸ Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa, op. cit., p. 99, indicates equipment was supplied by the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and Egypt.

⁷⁹ "Libya's Oil Boom" Economist, 194 (March 19, 1961) and "Plan for Libya?", Economist, 198 (January 7, 1961) provide some early assessment of the potential and problems of the oil discovery.

⁸⁰ "E. Pluribus Unum," Economist, 206 (February 2, 1963), p. 407.

elite and the newly emerging social groups"⁸¹ to widen. "The sense of shock and humiliation which followed the Arab defeat by Israel in June 1967, fueled the fires of disaffection."⁸² No element of society felt this more than the army which lacked the capability of effective employment, a clearly defined role, and even the power of the vote.⁸³ The large oil income no longer permitted the old rationale for complete reliance on foreign assistance to support a weak force of indecisive proportions. This quite naturally led to internal pressures for greater prestige and influence for the military force.

The king responded to these pressures by appointing Abd al-Hamîl al-Bakkush as Prime Minister. Bakkush, "who has been described as "a young, energetic reformer,"⁸⁴ enjoyed wide support among the young and professional elements of the society. His modernizing ideas offered much promise to all but the most conservative and traditional members of society. In the case of the military establishment, Bakkush took immediate action to modernize and increase in size the Libyan

⁸¹Lewis, op. cit., p. 36.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Khadduri, op. cit., p. 193.

⁸⁴Lewis, op. cit., p. 36.

forces in cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. These gains were effectively neutralized, however, with Bakkush's resignation in the fall of 1968. "Innovation and experimentation were laid to rest by the King upon the promptings of his conservative advisors, many of whom saw in the young Bakkush's imaginative initiatives a basic challenge to the royal hegemony."⁸⁵

Thus, the military moved to stage #2 of the continuum on the basis of expectations nurtured by education, resources which they were not allowed to share in, and frustration when anticipation of change was destroyed.⁸⁶ Movement from stage #2 through stage #3 to stage #4 was extremely rapid.

The very shortness of the time lapsed is indicative of the inability to influence the national problems by working within the system. National problems continued to grow worse after the Bakkush' regime. The population continued to move from the farms to the cities causing the agriculture to revert "to a semi-subsistence level, as families increasingly come to depend on the wages of an urban breadwinner."⁸⁷ Since the oil industry can support only 5 or 6 per cent of the labor force, serious social and economic problems continued to grow.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁶No literature is available which establishes the presence or lack of pressure by the military on Bakkush.

⁸⁷"After the Explosion," Economist, 212(July 18, 1964), p. 259.

Much of the oil wealth "was being pocketed by corrupt officials"⁸⁸ and some of it was being spent on expensive purchases such as "the fleet of 600 Mercedes-Benzes bought by King Idris for his officials and officers."⁸⁹ Additionally, favoritism, incompetence and lack of leadership of the government and king, the presence of "thousands of foreigners with their wicked habits, including liquor and mini-skirts"⁹⁰ incensed the military. Having no institutions, such as parties, to aggregate opinion the grievances found expression in the educated, frustrated, young military officers. Since the coup various junior officers have summarized the reasons for the coup and outlined the goals of the Revolutionary Command Council:

- (1) opposition to corruption and profiteering within the previous regime;
- (2) dissatisfaction with the performance of the monarchical institution;
- (3) bitterness over the undue influence of the Shalhi family both within the army and in royal councils; and
- (4) unappiness over Libya's conservative posture on international issues, particularly those relating to Libya's role in the Arab-Israeli dispute.⁹¹

⁸⁸"Textbook Coup in a Desert Kingdom," op. cit., p. 34. "Young Men in a Hurry," Time, 94(December 26, 1969), p. 17 indicates "About 600 ranking officers, politicians, civil servants and wealthy businessmen have been jailed" because of corruption and other reasons.

⁸⁹"New Libyan Regime's Goals Still Unclear," op. cit., p. 2.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Lewis, op. cit., p. 37.

The coup itself was so well executed that it has been described as a "textbook coup."⁹² The many similarities between the successful Libyan coup and unsuccessful 1960 Ethiopian coup makes the comparison particularly useful. In both cases the coup took place when the king was out of the country and least able to rally traditional sources of support. As in Ethiopia the crown-prince became a participant in the coup.

Prince Hassan al-Ridha appeared on the radio in mid-morning during the day of the coup to renounce his powers as deputy to the King and to express support for the new military regime. In the process, he requested the people of Libya to support the Revolutionary Command Council and⁹³ disassociated himself from any opposition to it.

As in Ethiopia the number of conspirators involved in the planning of the coup was small. A Revolutionary Command Council, operating from both Tripoli and Benghazi, and "composed of around ten officers and a few civilians"⁹⁴ in each city was formed. "The officers were, in fact, to be the executive committee of a sort of 'parliament' of some fifty military men and some twenty civilians who would vote on the most important decisions and on the appointment of new administrators."⁹⁵

⁹²"Textbook Coup in a Desert Kingdom," op. cit., p. 34.

⁹³Lewis, op. cit., p. 38.

⁹⁴C.E. Brown, "The Libyan revolution sorts itself out," Africa Report, (December, 1969), p. 12.

⁹⁵Ibid.

A number of critical differences in execution, however, can be noted in the Libyan coup. First, the conspirators were careful to seize the Tripoli and Benghazi radio stations which became their headquarters for subsequent operations. Second, no opportunity was provided for the king to return to Libya; his attempts to rally the people and solicit aid from Great Britain failed to produce results.⁹⁶ Third, the king's established procedures for controlling the military forces failed. The conspirators, lieutenants and captains, the young, educated, and frustrated, were those military personnel with the least stake in the system and the individuals who could be least pressured by appeals for loyalty to the establishment. Additionally, these young men such as al-Qadafi proved so capable as to accomplish "the pacific disarming of the Cyrenaica mobile force, the King's most loyal followers."⁹⁷ Finally, King Idris, as leader of the Sanussi order lacked the unified religious basis throughout his country that Haile Selassie had in Ethiopia, or Hassan II in Morocco.

In terms of the model the comparison with the other two countries is also meaningful. In Morocco the military is kept loyal by making them the focus of the king's power so that they have little to gain by changing the system; with

⁹⁶"How Brave to be a King," Newsweek, 74(September 15, 1969), p. 40, "Idris cabled a message to the rebels, ordering them to return to the barracks. He also sent an aide to London..."

⁹⁷Brown, op. cit., p. 13.

this system the military has gradually increased its power in moving along the continuum. In Ethiopia the military was controlled by division and balance with the other military sub-groups. In Ethiopia the military attempted to move from stage #1 to stage #4 without first passing through stage #2 and as a result failed in its coup attempt; since then it has moved steadily along the continuum.

Libya, while employing a system of controls similar to Ethiopia, did so with a much weaker base of support. The military entered independence in a very early portion of stage #1. They lacked any sense of responsibility for obtaining it--as did the other two countries. Like Morocco, and unlike Ethiopia, the military in Libya followed a pattern of progressive movement into stage #2; based upon a common identity of youth, education and support from the Bakkush government. The Libyan system, however, did not allow the movement into stage #3, but was not strong enough to prevent the movement into stage #2. Prevented from increasing its influence and prestige through participation in national problem solving, the military quickly removed King Idris.

Chapter 4

THEORY VERIFICATION

SOUTHEAST ASIA

General

The objective of this chapter is to further examine the monarchy/military relationship by studying Cambodia and Thailand. Since these studies were independent of those done during the "Theory Development" stage, common stages of development serve as a measure of cross-cultural verification; differences must be explained. Additionally, this chapter has as its goal to further develop and expand the theory so that it will be both more explanatory and more easily understood.

During the initial theory development it was concluded that the military could be viewed as opposing the monarchy along a continuum in a zero sum power relationship in which a power loss by one power center resulted in a gain by the other. The continuum was visualized as a sub-system in which the monarch and military were influenced in varying degrees by both modern and traditional inputs from the "environment" and through their personal relationship. The sub-system was assumed to include the elements commonly germane to general systems theory, and as described by David Easton in particular.

While the Southeast Asian examples give no reason

to discard the utility of the framework established, they did indicate a necessity to emphasize the major variables by means of a two dimensional display instead of a straight line relationship. Figures one and two below compare the two methods of display.




Fig. 1

LINEAR DISPLAY




Fig. 2

TWO DIMENSIONAL DISPLAY

Cambodia

From earliest history, when the power of the king was absolute, the monarchy has been the unifying symbol of Cambodian culture--of the relation of the Khmer people to their land and religion.¹

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Khmer power reigned over most of the areas known today as Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. The period of ascendancy began in the ninth century under the leadership of Jayavarman II. Jayavarman II not only united the country, he established the principles which have governed the monarchical tradition down to modern times.

Much of this tradition was imported and assimilated from Indian ideas and practices relating to royalty, law, and religious mythology. "Perhaps the most influential of these among the Khmer kings were notions on the organization of the state and the religious justification of kingly rule...concept of the *deveraja*, or god-king."² Central to this concept was the belief that "a divine king served as the intermediary between the gods, especially those controlling water and the fertility of the soil, and the social order."³

¹D.J. Steinberg, Cambodia: Its people, its society, its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1959), p. 1.

²R.M. Smith, "Cambodia," G. Kahin (ed.) Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 597.

³Ibid.

The divine king tradition was reinforced in Khmer society by the unbroken chain of dynasties which successfully preserved order internally and expanded the kingdom through military conquest. While the tradition became more firm, the burdens of the campaigns on the people and the economy eventually caused the people to rebel and society to decline.

This decline continued until 1884 when the French coerced King Norodom into making Cambodia a colony of France. French rule has a number of important aspects for this discussion. First, there was no break in the institution of the monarchy. The French "supported and encouraged" the monarchy in the eyes of the people "for as long as the people owed allegiance to the king and he was controlled by the French, then France could govern with a minimum expenditure of money and effort."⁴ Thus, the people were unaware that for all intents and purposes the French made the ultimate decisions and that the king did the French bidding.

Second, French rule effectively brought to an end the relationship between the king and the military establishment, since French military power displaced that of the Khmer. This meant that the close relationship between the king and the military, the history of conquest and glory was severed and a new tradition would grow out of the post-independence period.

⁴Ibid., p. 603.

A third critical factor to Cambodian history resulted from the fact that "control over the monarchy was obtained by manipulating succession to the throne."⁵ Thus, when Norodom died in 1904, instead of a successor being designated by the King or the King's High Council, the successor was designated by the French; the French selected Sisowath, a brother of the king instead of the king's sons. Although succession passed naturally to Sisowath's son, Monivong, in 1927(it was politically expedient to do so), the French faced a dilemma in 1941(upon the death of Sisowath) since his son Monireth was of an independent nature, and France was beset by difficulties because of World War II. Thus, Norodom Sihanouk, a great-grandson of King Norodom was proclaimed king. Sihanouk, then a school boy in Saigon, was thought to be weak and easily manipulated.

"It is important to realize that Sihanouk entered public life as a puppet of the French."⁶ Sihanouk's source of legitimacy was the combination of royal birth through both sides of Cambodian lineage(Norodom and Sisowath) and French power. Japanese conquest did not effectively increase Sihanouk's power. Although the Cambodian government re-instituted the absolute monarchy "real power fell to a rabidly anti-French intellectual, Son Ngoc Thanh, who occupied the

⁵Ibid., p. 604.

⁶D.P. Chandler, "Changing Cambodia," Current History, 59(December, 1970), p. 333.

posts of Foreign Minister and Premier until the French returned."⁷

Return of the French resulted in the removal of Son Ngoc Thanh and a French rule similar to pre-war days. Major changes included the authority to write a new constitution and the creation of a Cambodian army;⁸ although the French continued to be responsible for public order. Thus, the formal military force was founded as an apolitical, small, army force loyal to the king, but controlled by the French.

A second armed force, the followers of Son Ngoc Thanh, was created during the same period. Many of this group were students who had been educated in France and had absorbed liberal political values. This group, known as the Khmer Issarak, or Free Cambodians, advocated immediate independence from the French through force of arms. Their opposition to the gradual independence supported by the king caused them to form armed bands in the countryside. This movement eventually dissolved in 1947 when general amnesties were granted.

The Khmer Issarak movement again reasserted itself in 1951 when Son Ngoc Thanh was released and allowed to return to Cambodia. "It was at this point--mid-1952--that the king began to take matters into his own hands."⁹ Utilizing the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Cambodian forces became part of the French army in case of war.

⁹ Smith, op. cit., p. 614.

liberal interpretations of the constitution "that all power emanates from the king,"¹⁰ he quickly declared martial law, dissolved the Assembly and pursued the quest for independence. His dual success in getting the French to grant unconditional independence¹¹ in November, 1953, and the expulsion of the Viet Minh via the Geneva Conference of 1954 solidified Sihanouk's ruling position.

In summary, Cambodian history up to 1954 is extremely important in understanding later developments as analyzed in terms of the model. The legitimacy of the Sihanouk government was founded on an extremely weak basis as a French puppet. While being able to claim a historical royal line, Sihanouk lacked control of any military forces, a necessary symbol of power. This monarch-military relationship did not exist, or remained weak, resulting in the king legitimizing his regime through political acumen and negotiation rather than military force. Thus, the pattern of keeping the military small, weak, and apolitical was formed.

It becomes apparent that Sihanouk had three methods available with which to continue consolidation of his position. First, he could assert control of the military, emphasizing the historical relationship of monarch to military, and rely on the military as his source of power. Second, he

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹For a detailed account of how Sihanouk obtained independence and his attitudes on other periods of history see J.P. Armstrong, Sihanouk Speaks (New York: Walker and Company, 1964).

could continue to keep the military weak, relying on traditional kingship, suppressing opposition, and maintaining a loyal peasantry. Third, he could follow-up his success as a politician, relying on his political abilities to maintain his position.

He chose a combination of the second and third methods. His choice of political method and his unique style¹² served as the long-term causes of his downfall. His initial decision to become an active participant in the political arena had lasting effects.

In March, 1955, King Sihanouk abdicated the throne¹³ to become Prince Sihanouk, appointing his father, Prince Norodom Suramarit, to be king. Upon the death of his father in 1960, his mother, Queen Kossamak, became the ruling Monarch. As a short-term political tactic this allowed Sihanouk to continue to control the throne and at the same time personalize his power by taking charge of the government as Chief of State through the electoral process.

The long-term effects of lowering himself to the role of active politician, while controlling the royal apparatus in the background "deprived him of both the inviolability of his royal status and the benefits of the enormous following

¹²For a study of Sihanouk's charismatic leadership see R.M. Smith, "Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia," Asian Survey, 7(June, 1967), pp. 353-362.

¹³In essence he remained King since he controlled the throne.

he retained among the common people."¹⁴

As Allman points out

As an uncrowned king, the parliament could risk the constitutionally dubious act of voting him out of office. As a politician, he made the fatal mistake of assuming that popularity could be a substitute for direct control of the apparatus of power. When the final crunch came, the attenuated prestige of the crown, embodied by his mother, Queen Kossamak, was insufficient to save him. By choosing to rule indirectly through a premier and cabinet, Sihanouk also allowed the army and the bureaucracy to fall under his enemies control.¹⁵

Failure to maintain the royal position resulted in a gradual reduction in the traditional basis of legitimacy. While the military can not be considered to be involved in this change, since it was a unilateral, political decision, it did provide the "opportunity" for other political leaders to capture the loyalty of the military.

In terms of the model, the Cambodian army must be considered as having remained in the first stage of politicization until 1963. From its creation after World War II until the cessation of U.S. aid in 1963, the army was well paid (in relationship to the rest of the country), small, and kept in check by leaders whose loyalty to Prince Sihanouk was unquestioned. In 1963, U.S. aid to Cambodia was discontinued and the Cambodian army was moved into stage #2 of the continuum.

¹⁴T.D. Allman, "Anatomy of a Coup," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1970, p. 17.

¹⁵Ibid.

The withdrawal of U.S. aid "caused hardship among the urban middle class, especially the army."¹⁶ The withdrawal of aid soon "led to a deterioration of Cambodia's military equipment, which had come primarily from the United States. This downgrading had deep effects on the morale of Cambodia's officer corps, a close-knit group almost entirely loyal to General Lon Nol, the minister of defense in every Cabinet but one since 1955."¹⁷ There is no reason to doubt Lon Nol's loyalty to Prince Sihanouk at this stage in history since Sihanouk relied on Lon Nol to keep the army in line. It does point out, however, the fact that Lon Nol had a much closer relationship to the army than did the Prince. The extended period of this relationship with the army created a common-bond and loyalty which Sihanouk was to later underestimate.

A second element of the model was a growing list of unsolved problems. In retrospect, it is clear that a multitude of problems existed and that the problems (particularly economic) grew increasingly difficult to manage after the 1963 suspension of U.S. aid. Several authors isolate the year 1966 as being a key year in this cycle.

Chanda points out that "It was apparent from 1966... that Cambodia's internal stability was crumbling" and that

¹⁶N.R. Chanda, "The Four Year Coup," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1970, p. 26.

¹⁷Chandler, op. cit., p. 334.

"the coup, which curiously was rumoured to have been planned by Lon Nol in late 1966, took four years to materialize."¹⁸ Chandler states that "since 1966, in any case, destructive pressures had been building up between Sihanouk, on the one hand, and the Parliament, the intellectual and commercial elite, and the army officer corps, on the other."¹⁹

One of the problem areas was the general economic situation of the country. The various decisions which "led to the cancellation of American aid, the nationalization of all major commercial activity and the pursuit of austerity policies brought" on what is described as "slow but steady economic stagnation to Cambodia."²⁰

"Corruption (some rumored to involve the prince's family) was widespread."²¹ In particular, Sihanouk's wife, Madame Monique, a woman of Italian and Cambodian ancestry, was believed to be manipulating the prince for her own enrichment and political power. Additionally, it was felt she was using her position to further the career of her half brother, Colonel Oum Mannorine.²²

¹⁸ Chanda, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁹ Chandler, op. cit., p. 333.

²⁰ M. Osborne, "Cambodia: Runaway Coup D'etat," The Nation, 210 (June 8, 1970), p. 678.

²¹ "A prince falls in Asia and U.S. troubles rise," Life, April 3, 1970, p. 31.

²² Osborne, op. cit., p. 678. Osborne lists a series of additional reasons such as "the belief in Cambodian governing circles that Sihanouk was no longer dedicated to the hard work of statecraft." Osborne gives a detailed picture of the problems that were overtaking Cambodia and Sihanouk.

Officially, the reason for Sihanouk's downfall was the Communist presence in Cambodia. As the Economist indicated, "his autocratic and whimsical style of leadership was in the long-run tolerable only so long as he kept the Vietnamese successfully at bay."²³ The presence of over 60,000 Vietnamese Communist troops on Cambodian territory and their resultant control of a great portion of eastern Cambodia was the issue most difficult to hide or justify. "As the communists openly increased their infiltration, growing numbers of Cambodians came to realize the country was being turned into an occupied nation."²⁴ The traditional antipathy between Cambodians and Vietnamese intensified the problem.

The results of these, and other problems, had a direct impact on the army. The deterioration which had began in 1963 continued until

The Cambodian army by the late sixties was generally ill-equipped and undertrained. It faced major problems because of a weapons inventory culled from several sources. On occasion it was unable to respond to border incursions in more distant regions of Cambodia because it lacked gasoline. Frequently pro-Western in political attitudes, the officer corps found many grounds to resent its situation, but the loyalty of its leaders to Sihanouk, not least the loyalty of General Lon Nol, prevented the army from assuming a political role.²⁵

²³"Appeaser Falls," Economist, 234(March 27, 1970), p. 24.

²⁴"Coups in Cambodia--How Sihanouk Lost Out," U.S. News and World Report, 68(March 30, 1970), p. 18.

²⁵Osborne, op. cit., p. 678.

Under the economic conditions some corruption was present in the officer corps of the army; great profits could be made in dealing with the North Vietnamese. Yet, the army is by nature a somewhat pristine organization and it appears that Sihanouk made a wrong assumption "that illicit income had neutralized much of his own officer corps."²⁶

The question of the military incursion of the North Vietnamese forces is a natural area of interest for the Cambodian armed forces. No argument can be made for the probability of success of the Cambodian forces because of their small size (approximately 25,000) and condition already described. Some alienation, however, within the armed forces most likely occurred through failure to utilize the forces in a mission which was widely recognized throughout the country.

By 1966, the conditions existed under which the military could have become more extensively involved in Cambodia's problem solving process. This appeared more likely when Lon Nol briefly headed a rightist government in 1966;²⁷ his removal once again reduced his political power position. His return to power in 1969, in cooperation with Sirik Matak,

²⁶Chandler, op. cit., p. 335.

²⁷Chanda, op. cit., provides an excellent discussion of the political events of 1966. He describes "the polarisation of forces in Cambodia, though mostly unreported at the time, was very fast." The left wing accused the army of causing most of the problems that plagued the country.

saw his position stronger and that of the Prince weaker.

Formation of the "government of salvation" in August, 1969, can be considered the beginning of the immediate events that led to the coup. Lon Nol accepted the job as premier only on the condition that he could select his own Cabinet. Lon Nol chose Sirik Matak who among Cambodians had "always... been rated high on brains but low on patience, diplomacy and tact. A grade down from the royal scale of Sihanouk, he never has hidden his bitter opposition and disdain for his first cousin."²⁸ Sirik Matak is known as hard working, zealous, and uncorruptible.²⁹

Lon Nol, in turn, had always taken a hard line on the Vietnamese presence on Cambodian soil. Together, they provided an explosive combination which one author described as "the effect of giving the two men power was to admit the bankruptcy of Sihanouk's military and economic policies."³⁰ The military situation was particularly bad "for it now

²⁸ C.S. Foltz, Jr., "eyewitness: What Happened, Why," U.S. News & World Report, 68(March 30, 1970), p. 19.

²⁹ "From Vietnam to Indochina: The War Spills over as Sihanouk Falls and the Communists Advance in Laos," Newsweek, 75(March 30, 1970), p. 32, describes Sirik Matak's alienation. It states that he "was fed up with his royal cousin's socialist economics. Friendly to Americans, Matak has served a tour as Cambodia's ambassador to Peking, where he developed an intense dislike for the Chinese." "Right about face," Economist, 234 (March 28, 1970), p. 26, points out that Sihanouk had kept Sirik Matak out of the country for 8 of the last 12 years "first at Unesco, then as ambassador successively in Peking, Tokyo and Manila, an unfavourable diplomatic regression which is no doubt significant."

³⁰ Chandler, op. cit., p. 335.

seems likely that by 1969 several senior officers were seriously considering a coup d'etat against"³¹ Sihanouk.

Exactly when the Premier and the Deputy Premier finally agreed on a policy of confrontation with the prince and whether the original aim was to depose him is still not clear. Initially, emphasis was placed on the threat posed by the Vietnamese and the historic conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam. Sirik Matak "showed himself eager to encroach on what Sihanouk for decades had considered his personal prerogatives."³² His actions included taking control of foreign affairs into his own hands by ordering Cambodian embassies to report to him rather than the Prince. A series of economic reforms such as devaluing the riel, raising the pay of the military and civil service,³³ rejoining international financial institutions, liberalising trade and banking etc., and reversing Sihanouk's policies of progressive socialism.

By December, Sirik Matak was strong enough to win approval of the national congress for these policies and pressure four of Sihanouk's followers to resign from the cabinet.³⁴

In January, Sihanouk went to France for an extended rest. Lon Nol who had been in France since October, recup-

³¹Ibid.

³²Allman, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

³³M. Leifer, "Political upheaval in Cambodia," The World Today, 26(May, 1970), p. 182.

³⁴Allman, op. cit., p. 19.

erating from the death of his wife and personal illness, returned to Cambodia. Shortly thereafter, the information ministry was transferred from pro-Sihanouk Tep Chieu Kheng to Sirik Matak, resulting in a sharp escalation of anti-Vietnamese propaganda in the official press.³⁵ This campaign to discredit the Sihanouk soft-line of consiliation on this matter continued to build up until the coup in March.

Until Lon Nol's return to Cambodia, the activities of the army were limited. Action was taken by Lon Nol to "set plans in motion to increase the size of the Cambodian army by 25 per cent."³⁶ Thus, until March, the main role of the army was one of reorganization.

On March 8, "the army organized anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng province." On the 11th, "a team of 45 trained soldiers in civilian dress entered the embassy" (Provisional Revolutionary Government embassy) "and sacked it."³⁷ Later the North Vietnamese embassy was also destroyed, as were a Vietnamese Roman Catholic Church, houses, restaurants, etc. "The same afternoon, the National Assembly passed a unanimous resolution explicitly encouraging the disorders."³⁸ The demonstrations were made to look spontaneous, but in fact were well planned and army led, to give the appearance of

³⁵ Chanda, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁶ Chandler, op. cit., p. 336.

³⁷ Allman, op. cit., p. 19.

³⁸ Ibid.

being a popular revolt against Sihanouk's policy towards the Communists; the demonstrators had little idea that the demonstrations were an anti-Sihanouk move.³⁹

On March 13, Sihanouk was sent a cable informing him of basic changes in domestic and foreign policy and announcing that the 25,000-man Cambodian army was being augmented by 10,000 recruits. Sihanouk's response was to announce that he would return to personally appeal to the nation and the army to support him; offering to resign if the decision was against him. The threat of resignation was a tactic that Sihanouk had previously used (as have other authoritarian/father figures) effectively on the masses who have traditional viewpoints.

Sihanouk's only hope of resumption of his office at this point required that he maximize his sources of support and at the same time neutralize his enemies. His supporters were the peasant population (not including intellectuals and businessmen),⁴⁰ the police (a counter-balance to the weak army), the provincial governors, the Queen, and the secretaries of staff for ground defense and national security. Against Sihanouk were Lon Nol and the army, Sirik Matak and most of

³⁹Foltz, op. cit., p. 20 claims the students he talked to thought that they were helping the prince by their demonstrations in his negotiations with the communists.

⁴⁰A. Casella, "With Sihanouk in Peking," The Nation, 212(March 8, 1971), p. 306, knew the opposition well; "among those who support Lon Nol are not only the military, who are by profession anti-Communist, but also the bankers, the businessmen, the landowners--all those who constitute the right-wing elements in all countries."

the cabinet, and the National Assembly.⁴¹

The provincial governors and population were effectively neutralized as they had no resources at their disposal⁴² and had been conditioned by the propaganda campaign of the previous months. Queen Kosamak summoned Lon Nol and Sirik Matak to the palace and ordered them to cease the demonstrations, threatening to dissolve the National Assembly if they persisted. An aging, sickly woman, the Queen's power was effective only if Sihanouk was present to implement it. At this time Sihanouk also delayed his return to Phnom Penh until March 24, 1970, eliminating his possibility of making a direct appeal to the people.⁴³ This delay apparently gave the army and the National Assembly courage to take further action.

A combination of the above factors provoked Sihanouk's followers to attempt an abortive coup against Lon Nol,⁴⁴ and Colonel Oum Mannorine, secretary of state for ground forces, who had led the attempt was arrested and charged with

⁴¹Allman, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴²"Right about Face," op. cit., p. 26, contains a good summary of the capabilities of the peasants.

⁴³Casella, op. cit., p. 306, quotes Sihanouk as saying he didn't return to Phnom Penh because "I had known for several days before the coup that, had I returned to Cambodia, I would have been arrested, tried and executed by a group of army officers."

⁴⁴Chandler, op. cit., p. 336, claims one of the major reasons for Sihanouk's fall is that he "seems to have overestimated Lon Nol's loyalty to him and underestimated the loyalty of army commanders to Lon Nol. He also miscalculated the courage...of the National Assembly."

corruption. Colonel Sosthen Fernandez, secretary of state for national security, was removed from his job the next day.

At this point the coup was in effect complete and only needed to be formalized, which the National Assembly did on March 18, 1970, by voting Sihanouk out of office. Sirik Matak served not only as one of the driving forces behind the move, but also provided an alternate royal symbol to appeal to the traditional element.

The only immediate danger that remained was the possibility that Sihanouk might return. To eliminate this possibility, the army took charge of the airports and communications facilities and "Sihanouk was formally accused of nepotism, ineptitude, corruption and the crime of shipping arms to the Viet Cong..."⁴⁵ Sihanouk was discredited during the months that followed, culminating in October, 1970, in the proclamation of the Republic and formal end of the monarchy.

Why was it so easy to overthrow Sihanouk? Why was it so difficult to predict that he would be overthrown? The answers to these questions can best be explained by the model.⁴⁶ Initially, Sihanouk had a very weak basis of legitimacy, but having no military to oppose him, the support of the French, and a low problem level (because the French handled the important matters) he was able to survive.

⁴⁵"From Vietnam to Indochina: The war spills over as Sihanouk Falls and the Communists Advance in Laos," op. cit., p. 32.

⁴⁶See Fig. 3, p. 82.

Between 1941 and 1954, he increased his power by emphasizing traditional symbols and developing his relationship with the peasants. The peasantry was captivated by his charisma,⁴⁷ and he constantly encouraged their view of him as a god-king. The peasants, however, had very little power then, as now, and Sihanouk had to depend primarily on the elites in Phnom Penh for the support of his policies. This support perhaps reached its peak when independence was granted by the French.

Creation of an army added a new element of power. Not having relied on an armed forces to establish his legitimacy, nor having used the armed forces to fight for independence, Sihanouk did not develop a personal association with the army. He relied on a police force, the small size of the army, its scattered dispositions and most important the loyalty of Lon Nol to keep the army in check. Sihanouk, followed "a policy of trying to win over his opponents rather than destroy them, had left the army and the government honeycombed with officials up to the highest rank who were willing to turn the knife if the opportunity arose."⁴⁸ An occasional purge of opposing power centers, particularly the army, is an essential task in authoritarian regimes.


Beginning in 1955, the Sihanouk legitimacy line began to lower as he abdicated his royal power to his father, and, in

⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion of Sihanouk's charisma see Smith, "Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia," op. cit.

⁴⁸ Allman, op. cit., p. 18.

1960, to his mother (he named no heir). International and domestic problems increased during the period of 1955-63, resulting in Sihanouk's decision to discontinue U.S. aid. The effects of the loss of aid resulted in a general deterioration of the army and moved the army into stage #2 of the continuum. While the effects of the loss of aid were continuous (from 1963 until the coup), the army was prevented from moving into stage #3 because of their extreme loyalty to Lon Nol who continued to support the Prince.

When the problem line eventually was forced up to an unacceptable level by the Vietnamese invasion, economic problems, corruption etc., Lon Nol was forced to loosen his relationship with Sihanouk for the good of the country. This moved the army into stage #3 with the objective of pressuring Sihanouk by means of staged demonstrations etc. In the Cambodian case this period was very short and moved naturally to stage #4 in reaction to the Prince's response.



CAMBODIA

Fig. 3

Thailand

By 1910, when Chulalongkon died, great strides had been taken toward making the Thai government efficient and the Thai state unitary...but the character of the institution--the monarchy--remained virtually unchanged. The monarchy remained absolutist.⁴⁹

The historic and immediate events leading to the 1932 Coup have been selected for discussion in order to test and further develop the theory against time.⁵⁰ The 1932 Thai Coup, like the Cambodian Coup of 1970, came as a surprise to most observers; it need not have, as the necessary elements were present.

"While this event appeared to be an ideological rebellion against the outmoded system, the absolute regime itself had long paved the way for its own destruction."⁵¹ Changes took place in the monarchy and its relationship to the other elements of society, including the military, which led to the downfall of its absolute nature. Many of these changes were innovations of the kings, others resulted from the character and personality of the men who were king.

⁴⁹W. Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand (Berkley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 349.

⁵⁰Although numerous possibilities existed for a historical study, Thailand was selected because of the many authors who have commented on the 1932 revolution.

⁵¹T. Mekarapong, "The June Revolution of 1932 in Thailand: A Study in Political Behavior" (Indiana University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1962), p. 1.

The discussion of these changes is best done chronologically: first, the period prior to 1868; second, the period 1868-1910, which is inclusive of the reigns of Rama IV and Rama V; and third, the period 1910-1932, which includes the reigns of Rama VI and Rama VII and the immediate events preceding the coup.

Prior to 1868, Thai government and kingship is best described as traditional. The Thai system was "a system that granted monarchs greater power than did other absolutist systems in Asia."⁵² As Vella indicates, the Thai monarch stood at the peak of all pyramids of power--civil, military, and religious. He was infallible and inviolable; according to the Brahmanic ceremonies imported from Cambodia early in the fifteenth century, the Thai king was divine.

This divinity included the military matters in which the king was also supreme. "Many kings led their own armies in the field. The king was always free to choose his generals and to decide on military policy."⁵³ Apart from the need of an army for defense and conquest, the army served to prevent the usurpation of the throne. It is important to note that "the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne."⁵⁴

⁵²Vella, op. cit., p. 317.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 318-319.

⁵⁴R. Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," (Data Paper; Number 18 Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April, 1956), p. 7.

In the Thai case. it was useful for this purpose in that "in the 250 years before 1850, a new king was established as frequently by palace revolt as by orderly succession."⁵⁵

The current dynasty, Chakri, began in 1782 with the overthrow of King Taksin by General Chakri. While historical accounts disagree as to why the king was overthrown (it is generally thought that King Taksin went insane) they do agree that General Chakri had never "shown any sign of disloyalty to his king, had ever disobeyed a single order, or made a single complaint against his master."⁵⁶ When Chakri arrived before the city walls "it was obvious he had the Army behind him...obviously the senior officers could not offer the throne to him unless they knew that they had the backing of the junior officers and the rank and file. The people then were voiceless and all they asked for was a stable and just government."⁵⁷

It is necessary to include the above example to emphasize the fact that the current dynasty (and thus the current period of Thai history) was founded on a coup against the king by a general with the support of his army. It also points out the "voiceless" nature of the people

⁵⁵Vella, op. cit., p. 321.

⁵⁶C. Chakrabongse, Lords of Life (London: Alvin Redman, Ltd., 1960), p. 77.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 78.

whose main desire was for stability. It was this sense of noninvolvement of the populace, political movement and interaction only at the apex, which continued during the reigns of Rama I-III.

Much has been written about the reforms under Rama IV (Mongkut, 1851-68) and Rama V (Chulalongkon, 1868-1910). Both kings participated in sweeping reforms including administrative reorganization, the abolition of slavery, a new system of communication and education, the opening of the country to the west, etc. Essentially, they both recognized that absolute monarchy could survive only if the monarchy were the innovating force to modernize the country. In creating a modern polity both kings set in motion new forces which changed the monarchic role and "did not become fully apparent until the time of their successors."⁵⁸

Modernization also occurred during this period in the armed forces. Foreign military advisers were employed to create a modern army and navy trained along European lines. Care was taken to insure that the Thai government retained control over the advisors. Additionally, some of the sons of high-ranking officials were sent to Europe to learn Western techniques so as to improve the efficiency of the armed forces. By filling the key positions in the army with princes, Chulalongkon was able to insure the loyalty of the

⁵⁸F. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 93.

armed forces.^{59,60}

The last period of absolutist rule (1910-1932) was conducted under the leadership of Prachathipok and Wachirawut. Both had to contend with the new knowledge and ideas that had been imported from the West during Chulalongkon's reign. Vella concludes that "Wachirawut lacked his statesmanship, and Prachathipok lacked his strength. These deficiencies of the last two absolute monarchs in Thailand helped call attention to the deficiencies in the absolute monarchy itself."⁶¹

"Rama VI was by nature a poet and a moralist,"⁶² who liked to write and act in his own plays. He seemed to distrust the old officials who had served Chulalongkon, listening instead to his court favorites. Virginia Thompson states that "this gave rise to a system of corruption unparalleled in the country's history" and "brought to the fore all the difficulties and shortcomings inherent in one-

⁵⁹Vella, op. cit., pp. 343-6.

⁶⁰Riggs, op. cit., p. 108, claims that "Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, in other words, did not reform the government primarily as absolute monarchs. Rather, they transformed, and thereby subverted, the traditional role of the monarchy itself. In so doing, by creating, in effect, the new role of head of government (as contrasted with head of state), they brought into being a new political function for the polity. But this was a function which could not, over the long run be monopolized by a hereditary ruling family."

⁶¹Vella, op. cit., p. 351.

⁶²D.A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 109.

man rule."⁶³

"The most significant and most serious opposition to Wachirawut developed in the military forces. This opposition had its immediate origin in the favor he showed a special volunteer force, the Wild Tiger Corps, which he created early in his reign."⁶⁴ Having been educated at Sandhurst, Rama VI was an admirer of the British Territorial Army. Since the money was not available for a strong regular army, he patterned the volunteer force on that of the British and maintained it out of the Privy Purse.⁶⁵

Opposition to the Wild Tigers grew within the regular army because of the favoritism given to the volunteer force by the king. The volunteer army became in effect the personal army of the king.⁶⁶ He gave the organization a fine clubhouse and drill hall, elaborate uniforms, recruited for it the best rugby team in the country, participated regularly in its functions, and made it a social as well as a military organization.

⁶³V. Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 53-54.

⁶⁴Vella, op. cit., p. 354.

⁶⁵Chakrabonse, op. cit., p. 275.

⁶⁶W.J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 140 says this army "was a personal military plaything. It was bitterly resented by the regular military, and this resentment led to the unsuccessful assassination attempt."

"The brigade was soon the envy of the regular military forces in Thailand. A number of officers were so disgruntled that they began to think in terms of direct action against the King."⁶⁷ This resentment eventually resulted in a plot by "a group of men, mostly junior army and navy officers together with one civilian in the Ministry of Justice, ninety-one altogether"⁶⁸ to overthrow the government. The plot failed because one of the plotters revealed the plan.

Vella points out that "unlike the Thai conspirators of the eighteenth century and earlier, all of which were palace revolts, this conspiracy seems not to have relied on the direction of any royal faction."⁶⁹ In terms of the model, this has significance as the creation of a common identity among the armed forces; the passage into stage #2. That the effort failed is explainable by the fact that the military force lacked politicization and thus could not pass directly from a stage #1, apolitical force to stage #4. This weakness was noted by the conspirators in their oath as follows:

Those who have come to swear the oath in this ceremony may have known full well that we, the initiators of the revolution, who have studied the consequences of many revolutions, mostly those which occurred in foreign countries, realize that it is quite difficult to be successful. It always appeared that the first revolutionary group was arrested, tortured, or executed before they had succeeded. This has mostly been the case. Even though we may fail and receive a severe penalty, there would still be later groups

⁶⁷Vella, op. cit., p. 354.

⁶⁸Mokarapong, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶⁹Vella, op. cit., p. 354.

who would continue our work and, having learned the lesson from the previous groups, would eventually succeed...⁷⁰

In 1932, the prophesy of the organizers of the coup of 1912 came to pass.⁷¹ The reasons for the coup, its organization and execution, and its comparison to the attempt of 1912, provide a detailed understanding of a successful coup and the applicability to the model.

The death of Wachirarud in 1925 brought to the throne Prachathinok, "a serious-minded king but a weak one."⁷² "For temperamental, political, and economic reasons, Rama VII was not able to maintain the dynamic qualities of his three predecessors. As a prince, Rama VII was not thought a likely successor to the throne."⁷³ His lack of preparation for the kingship and lack of confidence to rule were clearly stated after his succession when "he said that he was not well prepared to be the King, and would not rule alone because, having served only as a soldier, he lacked knowledge and experience in government affairs."⁷⁴ To compensate for this

⁷⁰Mokarapong, op. cit., p. 4, as quoted from Leng Srichandh and Somchit Tlensiri, Karn Patiwat Ro. So. 130 (The Revolution of 1912), (Bangkok: Karn Pim Krungdhep Press, 1946), p. 129.

⁷¹It is alleged that in 1917 another conspiracy, by officers trained in Germany and opposed to Thailand's entry into World War I on the side of the allies, occurred and was hushed up.

⁷²Vella, op. cit., p. 356.

⁷³Wilson, op. cit., p. 112.

⁷⁴Mokarapong, op. cit., p. 116.

weakness, he created a Supreme Council of State consisting of older members of the royal family who in fact became "the real rulers of the country."⁷⁵

It is not surprising that under the conditions just described that Prachathipok did not inspire a great deal of confidence. His personal weakness combined with the trends noted in the general evolution of the monarchy kept the 'legitimacy line' on a downward course.

The 'problem line' continued its increase from the succession in 1925 until the coup in 1932. One of the most immediate problems was economic. Prachathipok inherited financial difficulties from his predecessor, to include large deficits in the national budget. This condition was greatly intensified in the late 1920's and early 1930's by the world-wide economic depression.

The large deficit forced the King to reduce expenditures in all possible ways, including reduction in salaries, reduction in forces etc. of both civilian and military forces. This action inspired grumbling in the army which found articulation through Prince Bowardej, the Minister of Defense,

who attempted to seek popularity in the Army, resigned in protest because his proposal to increase the salaries of the military officers at that time was turned down by the king on the advice of the Supreme Council. Following this event he instantly became a hero to the officers, and the members of the Supreme Council became more unpopular.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 125.

Sensing the discontent of the military, the King assembled a large number of army officers in November, 1931, to explain to them the economic difficulties and to solicit from them their support. This direct appeal seems to have elicited the desired emotional response on most of the officers who felt "the King appeared so anxious and powerless that the officers felt overwhelmed...but the King's appeal could not change the mind of the rebel officers, who, although they still had some respect for the King, had no respect whatsoever for the arrogant and powerful princes."⁷⁷

The conclusion that is reached is that the economic crisis was certainly a contributing factor, influencing both the timing of the coup and providing the "opportunity" for the intervention. It was, however, only one outward manifestation of the general problems that plagued the crown and which led to the overthrow. The organization of the coup, and the use of the military in the coup further illustrate the contributing problem areas.

The philosophic basis of the revolution and the idea for the overthrow "came first from the Thai students who were studying in France during the 1920's and who later contributed to the junior faction of the revolutionary group."⁷⁸ Beginning in 1897, scholarships were given to students of non-royal origin on the basis of competitive

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 129.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

examinations. Over a period of years this mixture of commoners and princes were exposed to the democratic way and "came to the conclusion that absolute monarchy was a sign of backwardness and should be replaced by democracy, which would bring progress and modernization to the nation."⁷⁹

Initially, the conspiracy was merely wishful thinking grown out of idealism; realistically, they had no troops, no or little influence within Thailand, and no other sources of power. Upon completion of their studies they returned to Thailand to serve in positions within the government, primarily in the army. Thus, the junior military faction (approximately twenty-three men), brought their ideas of revolution with them into the service. "Their plot appeared foolhardy and suicidal until late in the year 1931, when they could persuade some senior officers in the army to join them in planning the seizure of power."⁸⁰

This senior military faction provided the leadership and military forces for the coup. Although there is some evidence that a number of individuals in this group had also been secretly plotting a coup, their ideas do not appear to be nearly as well formulated as the junior faction. The senior faction's alienation was not so much philosophical as an impatience "with the inefficiency of the absolute government and its incapability in dealing with political and

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 6.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 15.

economic problems, especially during the early 1930's...the monopoly of power of the incompetent high princes...also felt displeased with the unjust actions of the royalty."⁸¹

A third group, consisting of civilians, also participated in the coup. Their reasons for participation represent a combination of the reasons outlined by the other two groups. All members of the coup groups were either close personal friends or subordinates of leaders of the factions. Of the "114 men,"⁸² slightly less than half were military men and of these all held staff positions. The lack of a senior troop commander was a major weakness which the plotters realized they had to overcome.

As in all coup attempts, success or failure depends on the ability not only to maximize strengths but to neutralize the possible sources of strength of the king. In this case, the military forces which might remain loyal to the king, the members of the royal court who had accumulated considerable power, and the king himself⁸³ represented these power centers.

The coup was so timed that the king was away from the capital at the seaside resort of Hua Hin when the coup occurred. This represented a dual purpose of having him at

⁸¹Ibid., p. 16. On pages 16-18 Mokarapong outlines a series of examples of how senior members felt they had personally suffered through failure of the Princes to accept their advice, legal injustices, etc.

⁸²Ibid., p. 27.

⁸³Since the King personally favored a Constitutional form of government (he had been advised against granting it by the Princes) he was not philosophically the biggest obstacle.

a location where he could not influence the takeover and at the same time would not be harmed. This tactic worked to perfection in that the king later legitimized the coup by accepting the Constitution proposed by the coup group and granting amnesty to all participants.

Neutralization of the high-ranking officials and royal princes, including the Chief of Staff of the Army, was accomplished by surveillance and arrest at the critical moment. This was facilitated by the efforts of the coup group to preserve the secret nature of their plotting and by interrupting the telephone services of the high-ranking officials prior to the coup; this prevented the organization of any resistance once the coup began.

Since the coup organizers had no troops of their own, they "decided to employ a political bluff as their strategy."⁸⁴ The key to the strategy was the control of the First Guard Cavalry Regiment in Bangkok which because of its armored vehicles and weapons (and its location in Bangkok) could be decisive in the revolution; control of this unit was gained through deception. On the day of the coup this regiment was utilized to surround the throne hall.

Assembled at the throne hall were all critical leaders of the military establishment who had come on the pretext of witnessing a demonstration by cadets from the Thai Military Academy. At the appropriate time the revolution was announced

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 28.

and the Thai Cadets spontaneously became the forefront of the revolutionary force. Although they knew nothing of the coup plans, their loyalty to the leaders who were members of the faculty who were members of the coup group, and their indoctrination by these same officers conditioned their response.

Since the troops from the various units had been deliberately mixed up the loyal officers had in effect lost control of their own units.⁸⁵ "Everyone thought everybody else had joined the revolution; and none dared think of resistance."⁸⁶ Execution was swift so as to present as little possible time for organization of a counter coup as possible.⁸⁷

While territorial units did exist, the coup organizers took very little cognizance of them, assuming that they would not be used if the capital was taken. Two basic reasons contributed to this being a correct assumption. First, as Heine-Geldern points out, "in Southeast Asia...the capital stood for the whole country,"⁸⁸ a factor growing out of both Brahman and Buddhist ideas about the universe.

⁸⁵Giffin, op. cit., p. 138, says "their success was enhanced by the absence of effective leadership in the royal military forces, and the passive dissatisfaction of large sectors of the civil and military bureaucracy with the status quo."

⁸⁶Mokarapong, op. cit., p. 45.

⁸⁷A Royalist effort was mounted in 1933, but was repulsed in bloody fighting north of Bangkok.

⁸⁸Heine-Geldern, op. cit., p. 3.

Second, from the time of King Chulalongkon forward the reforms had resulted in the centralization of political, military, and economic affairs. As Mokarapong points out, "it is thus not far from the truth to say that those who control Bangkok control Thailand."⁸⁹ While enhancing political power of the absolute monarchs, it also increased their vulnerability in that it neutralized the remaining forces within the country; without the King they could not act.

David Wilson effectively summarizes the origins of the coup as laying

...in three converging trends. First was the diminishing psychological power of the monarchy. This was a result of democratic ideas from the West, the softening of the more extravagant claims by the dynasty itself, and the diffident personality of Rama VII. The second trend came from the increased professional expertise among officials--especially those who had been educated in Europe--which aroused resentment against the growing royal monopoly of power. Third was the worsening state of finances in which the government found itself as a result of the developing world depression and previous extravagance.⁹⁰

In terms of the model, we can visualize a long-term diminution of the power of the monarchy. The legitimacy line appears strong until the assumption of the kingship by Wachirarut. By this time, forces set into motion by the policies of Mongkut and Chulalongkon began to have substantial

⁸⁹Mokarapong, op. cit., p. 87.

⁹⁰Wilson, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

effect upon the elite groups, particularly the military.

The regular military force was further alienated by the creation and favoritism shown to the Wild Tiger Corps, culminating in the abortive coup of 1912. While the coup did not succeed, it did condition the military forces politically in preparation for the coup of 1932. While problems existed, the problem line was not of a magnitude to create the conditions for a **coup**.

After Wachirarut's death in 1925, the legitimacy line grew rapidly weaker as the new King showed little desire or ability to run the country. His forfeiture of effective control to other members of the royal family allowed a serious situation of divided loyalty and corruption to occur. Among those injured by the injustices that occurred were a number of important military figures. The problems of the country were further escalated in the late 20's and early 30's because of the depression. In this instance the whole military organization was hurt because of the reductions in force and in pay.

By late 1931, the various factions of the coup organization had united. Because of the method in which the monarchy operated there was little opportunity for the coup members to solve the problems plaguing the country through influence alone. The only attempt to create pressure on the King resulted from the resignation of the Minister of Defense over the pay issue--it accomplished nothing.

Once the final decision was made to conduct the coup:

its success was dependent on its perfect execution and a great deal of luck. The weak nature of the legitimacy of the crown, the king's willingness to cooperate in a Constitutional form of government, and the centralized nature of power made the consolidation phase relatively easy.


Analysis in terms of the model presents somewhat of a dilemma. At this point it could very easily be argued that the military forces had simply moved from stage #2 through a minimal stage #3 to stage #4. This assumption is correct if a Constitutional monarch has no possibility of reestablishing an absolute government or returning to the condition where he can rule as well as reign.

If the above condition is not true then it is necessary to consider the current stage as stage #3 and that we have had an extended period (40 years) whereby the king has merely been controlled. This possibility can be supported by the fact that since the 1932 coup "which might well have closed the book on the monarchy, the Siamese kings have gradually risen to a position of unchallenged popularity."⁹¹ In fact, the growing importance of both popular support and residual importance of the throne have been recognized in Thai politics since 1932 by the fact that

In all the subsequent crises, coups and power shifts among the Thai elite, no matter by what means power has been seized, the new rulers have never failed to seek and obtain the king's sanction, and hence to legitimize their rule in the eyes of the masses, for whom the only true order is that which stems from the royal house.⁹²

⁹¹Riggs, op. cit., p. 107.

⁹²Ibid.



THAILAND

Fig. 4

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

General

Two types of conclusions are required for this study: first, conclusions regarding the monarch/military relationship as determined by the comparative, cross-cultural studies which were conducted; second, comments pertaining to the theory developed, its usefulness in analysis of the case studies, and suggestions for future studies of this type and their application to other governmental systems.

Military vs Monarchy¹

Traditional monarchies are an archaic form of government which have entered their terminal phase and soon will disappear. Within the next several decades only the oligarchical/constitutional forms of monarchy will remain; forms of government in which the king will fill a symbolic, reigning role, but will not rule. Where monarchs resist the change, republics will be declared and monarchy will disappear completely.²

Disposing of the monarch by a coup is simply a continuation of history, since coups have long been an effective

¹See Appendix B for comparative data regarding the countries studied.

²Military coups are a much cheaper, simpler and faster method of gaining control of a country than is a revolution; a procedure that the Communist powers will undoubtedly give greater attention to in the future.

method for removing kings from power. In the past, the leaders of the coup were normally of royal birth, providing a natural continuation of the royal line. Today, the basic change has been a shift from royal figures leading military forces to commoners who are military men leading their forces in the coup; a weak royal figure may or may not be utilized as a legitimizing symbol.

The reason for the military predominance is a result of what could appropriately be called the Monarch's dilemma. Ruling as a traditional monarch he can not solve modern problems and ruling as a modern leader he loses his traditional legitimacy. Either system requires an army whose leadership has close enough access to the throne to understand and observe the dilemma and to command the forces to suppress dissent when the king fails.

As time passes the military becomes politicized as it passes through the stages described in the theory. It is perhaps obvious that the military is not a monolith in its structure. The mass of the military force (like the masses of the population) has a highly traditional outlook. The junior leaders have been highly exposed to modern influences and have a more modern outlook. The senior military leaders often come from elite groups and reflect a combination of modern and traditional beliefs.

Herein lies the importance of the stages of the continuum, since stage #2 is the binding together of the leadership in a common political outlook to the more traditional

element of the force. Even then, it is not unusual to have to deceive the bulk of the forces to remove the king, and/or insure that the king is not present during the coup to rally the soldiers to his cause.

Impetus for coups comes from a few leaders who have been highly politicized. Their social status, prestige, and identity with the rule grows through their closeness to the apex and by means of their involvement in the problem solving process. During stage #3 these few leaders and the larger group of junior leaders are more closely associated in a common outlook. With the passage of time those close to the apex progressively see more clearly the inadequacies of the king, his weaknesses and vulnerabilities. When these politicized leaders reach a point where they feel they can better solve the problems without the king, the king is removed.

Rulers who aspire to continue to rule as well as reign must have both special qualifications and practice a policy of depoliticization of the military. The first of these tasks requires the king to have an established record of leadership over a period of time in military affairs. Depoliticization requires the prevention of the formation of meaningful political relationships within the military. Loyalties must be to the throne first and to military leaders second; either many competing organizations within the military must be formed or leadership must be changed frequently. More ideally, the king must be the real military leader as well as the titular

one.

The king, then, is weak and vulnerable unless he controls the military force. In this respect, the king is no different from the military leader who usurps power except for the accident of a royal birth. Like the king, the usurpers must establish their legitimacy and solve the problems or they too will soon find a newly politicized force seizing power.

Theory and Future Investigations

The conclusion to this paper, like most papers having simple frameworks dealing with complex problems, represents a beginning to the study of the problem rather than the end. This paper represents the author's synthesis of the ideas and literature affecting the process of politicization of the military as illustrated in the monarchies of North Africa and Southeast Asia.

Use of paired relationships and a simple framework help illustrate the necessity of a clear understanding of the sub-systems as building blocks to understand the whole system. To be more theoretically useful it is clear also that the scope of both the macro and micro considerations must be expanded.

New studies should first be made in monarchies in other cultures. By keeping the monarchical variable constant,

the simple paired relationship of military and monarchy can be explored for additional dimensions. Four considerations in particular need to be investigated:

1. Movement between stages along the continuum-- verification of the ability or inability to omit stages of the continuum.
2. Regression--the probability of moving in the other direction along the continuum and, in effect, the depoliticization of the military.
3. Additional operational indicators which might allow additional stages, alternate paths of progression and refinement so as to provide clearer and more useful conceptualization.
4. Evaluation of monarchies which have expired in an earlier time-frame, in greater detail, so as to eliminate contemporary biases.

Once these initial areas have been developed for the substantive theory the process will have to be repeated for the various forms of government to lay the basis for general theory. The integration of the various substantive studies will result in a more detailed, refined, lengthy, and empirically categorized model, with a fully theoretically developed base. The resulting "Theory of Military Politicization" will undoubtedly make coup predicting a more precise art, but not necessarily a more accurate one.

Accurate prediction of military involvement will require additional models to be built to include the actors

and interests of other groups which can potentially influence and control the politicization of the military. A final overlay of these models and a weighted system of values will provide a more complete understanding of the problem. The first step, however, at our current level of development must be a greater understanding of the simplest paired relationships.

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APPENDIX A
SYSTEMS THEORY

APPENDIX A

"...the primary goal of political analysis is to understand how political systems manage to persist through time."(55)¹

In his book The Political System, David Easton established the need for utilizing the behavioral approach to analyze political systems. In A Framework for Political Analysis, he outlines the conceptual tools necessary for understanding and analyzing political systems. The value of the approach is that "systems analysis directs our attention toward the processes that all types of political systems share and that make it possible for them to cope, however successfully, with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a society to sustain any political system at all."(79)

While the current paper does not repeatedly stress the Eastonian system in its presentation, it is essential to accept it as a major influence on the work, and recognize the general importance of systems theory to the understanding of the paper. Failure to understand systems operation and the multitude of forces at work upon the system (both internal and external) will very likely distort the reader's under-

¹D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 55. All quotations in Appendix A will be from this reference and will be indicated in parentheses following the quotation.

standing of the sub-system discussion. For the above mentioned reasons, a detailed reading of A Framework for Political Analysis is recommended to augment the discussion which follows, prior to the reading of the text of the paper.

"The bare minima by way of major concepts that need to be understood for the analysis of political life in the systems framework are system, environment, feedback, and response." (25)

- "1. System. It is useful to view political life as a system of behavior.
2. Environment. A system is distinguishable from the environment in which it exists and open to influences from it.
3. Response. Variations in the structures and processes within a system may usefully be interpreted as constructive or positive alternative efforts by members of a system to regulate or cope with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal sources.
4. Feedback. The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences that return to its actors and decision-makers." (24-25)

Each political system can theoretically be isolated for purposes of analysis by separating it from its "environment" by a "boundary." The conceptualization can be greatly simplified by visualizing the environmental influences as a single entity which can be called "input." "Input" is composed of indicators known as "demands" and "support"

indicators.(112)²

Within the political system itself, a "conversion" process takes place. "Inputs" are received, and perceived as varying degrees of "stress" on the system. Based upon the interpretation of the nature and severity of the stress, "decisions and actions" are taken which can be visualized as outputs. (80-95)

"Outputs" are essentially regulative responses to keep the system in balance. They are normally in the form of "structural regulation" (structure, norms, and goals), "diffuse support" (reservoir of support through past political socialization), and "specific supports" (specific benefits or advantage to members of the system). (124-125) "Feedback" is then sampled to see how the "outputs" have been received; the response is again felt through "inputs" and the system proceeds through a new cycle.

If the responses to the "stress" on the system are not sufficiently satisfying the system eventually reaches a "critical point."

The critical point will vary with the type of system and with time and place; in general, we would need to bear in mind that each system or type of system does have a critical point.

Similarly, even where the authorities are fully capable of making decisions and of seeking to implement them, compliance will vary on a continuum. (97)

²It is possible to equate to a degree his concept of "support" to my use of legitimacy and "demand" to my problems level. "Environment" for the countries discussed will be expanded upon in Appendix B to this paper.

Three of the five political systems analyzed in this treatise reached "critical points" at which the apex (the monarch) was not able to sufficiently alleviate the "stress" upon the system. The increasing "demands" and decreasing "supports" eventually resulted in the monarch's replacement at the apex of the political system by military leaders. In two of the five cases the "critical point" was reached for certain elements along the continuum, but not in sufficient strength to internally alter the system.

This treatise focuses on the internal relationship between the monarch and the military (particularly the leadership), both of which occupy positions near the center of power. As such, the relationship represents a sub-system (probably "Personality Systems" in Eastonian terms) within the "Intra-Societal Environment."

The crucial point to be taken from this discussion is the fact that we must keep this sub-relationship in perspective to the system. The system functions as outlined by Easton. Within the system two elements (military and monarch) are influenced by "inputs" from the "environment," but not necessarily in the same manner or degree. When the "outputs" by the monarch become clearly inadequate the military can become politicized to such an extent that instead of strong supports for the king, the military begins to place increased "demands" of its own on the system.

It is possible for the sub-system to become critical

to a degree that the military utilizes the direct relationship within the sub-system to seize power. The monarch, in turn, takes action within the sub-system to keep it from becoming "critical." The comparative study of this sub-system within the five societies is the substance of this treatise.

APPENDIX B

DATA

APPENDIX B

DATA

It is our feeling that the stage has not been reached where a comprehensive analysis of political systems can fruitfully be undertaken by restricting oneself exclusively to purely quantitative indices.¹

Similarly, to restrict oneself to qualitative and descriptive studies would not take full advantage of one of the useful tools in theory development and/or theory validation. It is as Karl W. Deutsch has put it, "a constant interaction between man and data."² Man must control the data and carefully recognize its weaknesses and limitations.

Collection of data presents somewhat of a paradox; to collect your own data involves the risk of shaping the data collection to support or validate the theory; to utilize independent studies it is necessary to accept and adapt data not specifically designed to study the problem under analysis. Limitations on the data studies become limitations on the use of the data in the subsequent studies.

The theory developed in the preceding sections is fortunate in being able to take advantage of a number

¹A.S. Banks and Robert E. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 7.

²Ibid., p. vi.

of seminal political science works which are adaptive to its study. Among these are Banks and Textor's, A Cross-Polity Survey, Russett, Deutsch, Lasswell, et. al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, and Almond and Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas.³ Each of these works has its own importance and is as Russett wrote of the Banks-Textor effort

To us the importance of the Banks-Textor effort, and less ambitious works of a similar type, is complementary rather than competitive to the one undertaken here.⁴

One characteristic of the works utilized was their early 1960's time-frame. The importance of this is that it is prior to the coup's and coup attempts studied (except Thailand), enabling the data to be unbiased by subsequent events. In working towards a predictive theory it seems essential to proceed in the manner described. The above works also had the advantage of evaluation within a world polity rather than a limited sampling for a particular purpose.

The conclusions which follow recognize the limitations outlined by each of the authors in their studies. For instance, Banks and Textor outline four problem areas: Unavailability of data, reliability, redundancy, and validity. Russett adds the problem of the lack of international

³See also for example, K.W. Deutsch, "Toward an inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review, 54(March, 1960), pp. 34-57.

⁴B.M. Russett, et. al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 8.

agreement on definition of certain terms and the deliberate distortion of data by governments.⁵

The data study, which follows, is not designed to prove that the qualitative discussion is correct; although it does lend credence to some of the previous observations. Rather, it provides a country profile of each country (on a comparative basis) and a base for future studies of the problem.

In reviewing the data the reader should keep in mind the concept of "environment" (See Appendix A) on the coup attempts and their success and failure. Thailand is included in order to compare its data as a control mechanism with that of the other four countries.

The high correlations between all five countries in many of the categories should not be disturbing since all contain the seeds of revolution and disruptive forces, but in varying proportions. Much of the data simply describes underdeveloped countries in general; others highlight the regional differences that exist.

Additionally, the studies (except in isolated cases) do not measure RATE OF CHANGE which could well be a critical variable.

In conclusion, it is hoped that the very least the data will accomplish is to provide the reader with a deeper appreciation of the conditions which can be conducive to the precipitation of a military coup. Should the reader

⁵Banks, op. cit., p. 6, and Russett, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

be able to detect additional trends and patterns which are useful to future studies the effort will have had additional value.

The tables which follow are arranged in the order listed below:

Table 1--Comparison of the Conclusions of Coleman and Russett

Table 2--Profile Data from Russett

Table 3--Profile Data from Banks and Textor

Table 4--Janowitz Data on Military Forces--1964

Table 5--The Military Balance--1971

Table 1

Extracts from Russett, TABLE B.2, "Stages" of Economic and Political Development, Summary Table, pp. 294-298.

I. "Traditional Primitive" Societies

Ethiopia

Libya

II. "Traditional Civilizations"

Thailand

Cambodia

III. "Transitional" Societies

Morocco

IV. "Industrial Revolution" Societies

V. "High Mass-Consumption" Societies

NOTE: The author indicates that "the difference between stages I and II, and among III, IV, and V, are slight and can be ignored. But the differences between stage II and stage III is very striking." (page 299)

	<u>Ethiopia</u>	<u>Libya</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Morocco</u>
G.N.P. per capita	55	60	96	99	142
% Urban (20,000)	1.7	18.4	7.7	16.0	29.1
% Adult Literacy	2.5	13.0	68.0	17.5	19.9
Higher Education per 100,000	5	49	251	18	40
Inhabitants per Physician(thousands)	117	5.8	7.5	95	9.4
Radios per 1,000	4.5	63.1	6.2	6.5	45.5
% Voting	-	-	-	-	-
% Military(15-64)	.28	.69	.90	1.49	.48
% of Expenditure of Central Government	-	-	15.2	-	-

Extracts from Almond and Coleman, "Classification of Political Systems in Underdeveloped Areas," p. 534.

<u>Degree of Competitiveness</u>	<u>Degree of Political Modernity</u>	<u>Countries</u>
Competitive	Modern Mixed	
Semi-Competitive	Mixed	Morocco Thailand
Authoritarian	Mixed	Cambodia Libya
	Traditional	Ethiopia

Extracts from Almond and Coleman, Table 4, "Composite Rank Order of Asian and African Countries on Eleven Indices of Economic Development," p. 542.

Type of Political System

Semi-Competitive		Authoritarian	
Independent	Colony	Independent	Colony
10. Morocco			
21. Thailand			
		22. Libya	
		42. Cambodia	
		46. Ethiopia	

Extracts from Almond and Coleman, Table 6, "Functional Specificity of Structure in Asian and African Political Systems," pp. 564-567.

Performance of Governmental Functions: Over Participation by

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

TUTELARY DEMOCRACY

Morocco--Executive, Bureaucracy, Dominant Party

TERMINAL COLONIAL DEMOCRACY

MODERNIZING OLIGARCHY

Thailand--Executive, Bureaucracy, Army, Parliament Absent
or Non-Functioning

COLONIAL AND RACIAL OLIGARCHY

CONSERVATIVE OLIGARCHY

Cambodia--Executive, Parliament Absent or Non-Functioning

Libya--Executive, Parliament Absent or Non-Functioning

TRADITIONAL OLIGARCHY

Ethiopia--Executive, Parliament Absent or Non-Functioning

Performance of Political Functions: Over Participation By

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

TUTELARY DEMOCRACY

Morocco--Executive, Dominant Party

TERMINAL COLONIAL DEMOCRACY

MODERNIZING OLIGARCHY

Thailand--Executive, Press Absent or Non-Functioning

COLONIAL AND RACIAL OLIGARCHY

CONSERVATIVE OLIGARCHY

Cambodia--Executive, Press Absent or Non-Functioning

Libya--Executive, Press Absent or Non-Functioning

TRADITIONAL OLIGARCHY

Ethiopia--Executive, Bureaucracy, Religious Organization,
Press Absent or Non-Functioning

Extracts from Almond and Coleman, "Economic Development in Underdeveloped Countries," pp. 580-582.

COMPETITIVE

SEMI-COMPETITIVE

Morocco

Thailand

AUTHORITARIAN

Libya

Cambodia

Ethiopia

Number of Persons

	<u>Morocco</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Libya</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Ethiopia</u>
Per Capita G.N.P.	159	100	90	n.d.	54
Per Doctor	10,150	7,020	10,420	89,700	137,000
Per Vehicle	56	408	939	n.d.	763
Per Telephone	85	1,759	149	1,442	2,753
Per Radio	22	191	64	614	1,429
Per Newspaper	43	275	167	300	2,000
Per Capita Energy Consumed	.24	.04	n.d.	.04	.01
% Population in Labor Unions	8.6	.6	.4	.1	.0
% Pop in Cities over 100,000	15.0	4.5	15.0	.0	2.6
Literate	15	54	10	20	5
Primary Enrollment	10	54	n.d.	18	n.d.

Table 2

Extract of Profile Data from Russett, Part A, Distribution Profiles

Human Resources

1. Total Population, 1961 (133 cases)

19--Thailand	27,181,000
22--Ethiopia	22,122,000
38--Morocco	11,925,000
68--Cambodia	5,335,000
114--Libya	1,216,000
2. Percentage of Population of Working Age(15-64)(128 cases)

74--Ethiopia	56.0
80.5--Libya	55.8
84.5--Morocco	55.4
87--Thailand	55.3
104--Cambodia	53.1
3. Wage and Salary Earners as a Percentage of Working-Age Population (79 cases)

70--Morocco	17.9	1950
76--Thailand	11.2	1960
4. Female Wage and Salary Earners as a Percentage of Total Wage and Salary earners (69 cases)

33--Thailand	26.6	1960
64--Morocco	12.1	1952
5. Live births per 1,000 population (86 cases)

40.5--Thailand	42.0	1956
43--Cambodia	41.4	1959
6. Deaths per 1,000 population (56 cases)
7. Natural increase of population--Annual rate (60 cases)
8. Annual percentage rate of increase in population 1958-1961 (111 cases)

7--Cambodia	3.8
25.5--Thailand	3.0
33.5--Morocco	2.8
73.5--Libya	1.8
9. Percentage of Population in Cities over 20,000 (120 cases)

46--Morocco	24.2	1960
60--Libya	18.4	1955
66--Cambodia	16.0	1955
92--Thailand	7.7	1947
116--Ethiopia	1.7	1955

10. Percentage of Population in Cities over 20,000 (120 cases)
 50--Morocco -.19 1951-1960

Government and Politics

11. Expenditure of General Government as a Percentage of G.N.P. (28 cases)
12. Revenue of General Government as a Percentage of G.N.P. (29 cases)
13. Expenditure of Central Government as a Percentage of G.N.P. (41 cases)
 30--Thailand 13.9
14. Revenue of Central Government as a Percentage of G.N.P. (41 cases)
 28.5--Thailand 12.8
15. Expenditure of General Government, Social Security, and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of G.N.P. (28 cases)
16. Revenue of General Government, Social Security, and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of G.N.P. (29 cases)
17. Expenditure of Central Government, Social Security, and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of G.N.P. (41 cases)
 34.5--Thailand 15.2
18. Revenue of Central Government, Social Security, and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of G.N.P. (41 cases)
 32--Thailand 14.2
19. Employed by General Government and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of Working-Age Population (18 cases)
20. Employed by Central Government and Public Enterprises as a Percentage of Working-Age Population (21 cases)
 20--Thailand 1.24 1958
21. Military Personnel as a Percentage of Total Population (82 cases)
 36--Cambodia .79 1959
 49--Thailand .50 1961
 59--Libya .38 1959
 64.5--Morocco .27 1959
 72.5--Ethiopia .14 1959
22. Military Personnel as a Percentage of Population Aged 15-64 (88 cases)
 30--Cambodia 1.49 1959
 44.5--Thailand .90 1961
 56.5--Libya .69 1959
 63--Morocco .48 1959
 72.5--Ethiopia .28 1959

23. Expenditure on Defense as a Percentage of G.N.I.
(82 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| 8--Cambodia | 6.10 | 1959 |
| 16.5--Libya | 5.10 | 1959 |
| 23.5--Morocco | 4.40 | 1959 |
| 33.5--Thailand | 3.00 | 1959 |
| 50--Ethiopia | 2.20 | 1959 |
24. Votes in National Elections as a Percentage of Voting-Age Population (100 cases)
25. Votes for Communist Party as a Percentage of Total Vote (44 cases)
26. Votes for Religious Parties as a Percentage of Total Vote (56 cases)
27. Votes for Socialist Parties as a Percentage of Total Vote (58 cases)
28. Votes for Noncommunist Secular Parties as a Percentage of Total Vote (57 cases)
29. Deaths from Domestic Group Violence per 1,000,000 Population, 1950-1962 (74 cases)
- | | |
|----------------|----|
| 30--Ethiopia | 10 |
| 38.5--Thailand | 3 |
30. Executive Stability: Number of Years Independent/Number of Chief Executives 1945-1961 (87 cases)
- | | |
|----------------|------------------------|
| 3.5--Ethiopia | Stability Index--17.00 |
| 43.5--Morocco | Stability Index-- 3.00 |
| 58--Libya | Stability Index-- 2.20 |
| 72.5--Thailand | Stability Index-- 1.42 |
| 86.5--Cambodia | Stability Index-- .54 |

Communications

31. Daily Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population (125 cases)
- | | | |
|-----------------|----|------|
| 77.5--Morocco | 22 | 1960 |
| 86.5--Thailand | 14 | 1960 |
| 100--Libya | 7 | 1960 |
| 102.5--Cambodia | 6 | 1960 |
| 113.5--Ethiopia | 2 | 1960 |
32. Items of Domestic Mail per Capita (76 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|
| 56--Morocco | 4.3 | 1956 |
| 59--Libya | 3.0 | 1960 |
| 69.5--Thailand | 1.4 | 1961 |

33. Items of Foreign Mail Sent per Capita (74 cases)
 28--Libya 5.08 1960
 44.5--Morocco 1.63 1961
 70--Thailand .13 1961
34. Foreign Items Sent/Foreign Items Received (74 cases)
 27.5--Morocco .841 1961
 38--Libya .704 1960
 70--Thailand .318 1961
35. Radios per 1,000 Population (118 cases)
 63--Libya 63.1 1959
 75--Morocco 45.5 1961
 98--Cambodia 6.5 1960
 99--Thailand 6.2 1960
 105--Ethiopia 4.5 1961
36. Radios per 1,000 Population--Average Annual Increase
 59.5--Morocco 2.9 1948-1960
 92.5--Thailand .1 1950-1960
37. Television Sets per 1,000 Population(1961) (69 cases)
 52--Thailand 2.9
 66--Cambodia .1
38. Cinema Attendance per Capita (104 cases)
 64.5--Libya 3.0 1957
 78.5--Morocco 1.5 1961
 87--Cambodia .6 1960
39. Speakers of Dominant Language as a Percentage of Population (66 cases)
 20--Libya(arabic) 90.0 1942
 28--Morocco(Arabic) 77.4 1942
 36--Ethiopia(Amharic) 60.8 1942

Wealth

40. Area(Square Kilometers) (133 cases)
 13--Libya 1,759,540
 25--Ethiopia 1,184,320
 45--Thailand 514,000
 50--Morocco 443,680
 78--Cambodia 172,511
41. Population per Square Kilometer (133 cases)
 53--Thailand 53
 62--Cambodia 31
 66--Morocco 27
 77.5--Ethiopia 17
 131--Libya 1

42. Population per 1,000 Hectares of Agricultural Land
(115 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|-------|------|
| 32--Cambodia | 2,180 | 1956 |
| 47--Thailand | 1,352 | 1957 |
| 75--Morocco | 644 | 1960 |
| 103--Libya | 106 | 1959 |
43. Gross National Product, 1957, \$ U.S. (122 cases)
- | | |
|--------------|---------------------|
| 47--Thailand | 2,062 (in millions) |
| 54--Morocco | 1,441 |
| 61--Ethiopia | 1,100 |
| 85--Cambodia | 456 |
| 115--Libya | 68 |
44. Gross National Product per Capita, 1957, \$ U.S. (122 cases)
- | | |
|-----------------|-----|
| 77--Morocco | 142 |
| 91.5--Cambodia | 99 |
| 94--Thailand | 96 |
| 110.5--Libya | 60 |
| 115.5--Ethiopia | 55 |
45. Annual Growth of G.N.P. per Capita (68 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----------|
| 48--Thailand | 1.7 | 1952-1960 |
| 59.5--Cambodia | 1.0 | 1953-1959 |
46. Foreign Trade (Exports and Imports) as a percentage of G.N.P. (81 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|----|------|
| 2--Libya | 79 | 1959 |
| 43.5--Thailand | 35 | 1959 |
| 47--Morocco | 33 | 1959 |
| 55.5--Cambodia | 28 | 1959 |
| 67--Ethiopia | 20 | 1959 |
47. Gross Domestic Capital Formation as a Percentage of G.N.P. (77 cases)
- | | | |
|---------------|------|-----------|
| 49.5--Morocco | 16.1 | 1951-1958 |
| 59--Thailand | 14.3 | 1952-1957 |
48. Private Consumption as a Percentage of G.N.P. (62 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|------|-----------|
| 15--Thailand | 76.8 | 1952-1957 |
| 20--Morocco | 74.5 | 1951-1958 |
49. Percentage of Gross Domestic Product Originating in Agriculture (75 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|----|------|
| 15--Cambodia | 41 | 1959 |
| 18.5--Thailand | 38 | 1961 |
| 33.5--Morocco | 27 | 1961 |
50. Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture (98 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|----|------|
| 8--Thailand | 82 | 1960 |
| 11--Cambodia | 80 | 1955 |
| 19--Morocco | 71 | 1952 |

51. Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture--
Average Annual Change (49 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|------|-----------|
| 6--Morocco | -.19 | 1936-1952 |
| 14--Thailand | -.30 | 1937-1960 |
52. Nonagricultural Employment as a Percentage of Working-Age Population (77 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| 68.5--Thailand | 17.2 | 1960 |
| 72--Morocco | 16.1 | 1952 |
53. Employment in Industry as a Percentage of Working-Age Population (73 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|-----|------|
| 58--Morocco | 8.8 | 1952 |
| 74--Thailand | 4.6 | 1960 |
54. Unemployed as a Percentage of Working-Age Population.
Average 1958-1960 (55 cases)
- | | | |
|-------------|-----|--|
| 30--Morocco | .53 | |
|-------------|-----|--|
55. Unemployed as a Percentage of Wage and Salary Earners
(34 cases)
56. Index of Achievement Motivation--Children's Readers,
1950 (41 cases)

Health

57. Life Expectancy: Females at Age Zero (72 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|------|--------|
| 51--Thailand | 51.9 | 1947-8 |
| 59--Cambodia | 43.3 | 1958-9 |
58. Infant Deaths per 1,000 Live Births (50 cases)
59. Inhabitants per Physician (126 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|---------|------|
| 1--Ethiopia | 117,000 | 1956 |
| 5--Cambodia | 95,000 | 1960 |
| 38--Morocco | 9,400 | 1960 |
| 44--Thailand | 7,500 | 1960 |
| 50.5--Libya | 5,800 | 1960 |
60. Inhabitants per Hospital Bed (129 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|-------|------|
| 7--Ethiopia | 3,000 | 1960 |
| 14.5--Cambodia | 1,800 | 1960 |
| 27--Thailand | 1,200 | 1960 |
| 41.5--Morocco | 680 | 1960 |
| 70--Libya | 320 | 1960 |
61. Inhabitants per Hospital Bed--Annual Percentage Rate of
Change (90 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|-----------|
| 79.5--Cambodia | -5.4 | 1952-1960 |
| 86.5--Thailand | -7.4 | 1954-1960 |

Education

62. Students Enrolled in Higher Education per 100,000 Population (105 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|
| 50--Thailand | 251 | 1960 |
| 82--Libya | 49 | 1959 |
| 84--Morocco | 40 | 1960 |
| 93--Cambodia | 18 | 1960 |
| 99.5--Ethiopia | 5 | 1960 |
63. Primary and Secondary School Pupils as a Percentage of Population Aged 5-19 (125 cases)
- | | | |
|-----------------|----|------|
| 62--Thailand | 46 | 1960 |
| 77.5--Libya | 35 | 1959 |
| 85--Cambodia | 31 | 1960 |
| 99.5--Morocco | 21 | 1960 |
| 124.5--Ethiopia | 2 | 1960 |
64. Percentage Literate of Population Aged 15 and Over (118 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| 45--Thailand | 68.0 | 1960 |
| 90.5--Cambodia | 17.5 | 1950 |
| 96.5--Libya | 13.0 | 1954 |
| 98--Morocco | 12.5 | 1950 |
| 114--Ethiopia | 2.5 | 1950 |
65. Percentage Literate of Population Aged 15 and Over--
Average Annual Increase (43 cases)
- | | | |
|---------------|------|-----------|
| 7.5--Thailand | 1.23 | 1947-1960 |
|---------------|------|-----------|

Family and Social Relations

66. Marriages per 1,000 Population Aged 15-44 (50 cases)
67. Immigrants per 1,000 Population (41 cases)
- | | | |
|-------------|--|-----------|
| 24--Morocco | | 1957-1958 |
|-------------|--|-----------|
68. Emigrants per 1,000 Population (40 cases)
- | | | |
|------------|------|-----------|
| 8--Morocco | 4.63 | 1957-1958 |
|------------|------|-----------|

Distribution of Wealth and Income

69. Distribution of Agricultural Land: Gini Index of Inequality (50 cases)
- | | | |
|-----------|------|------|
| 31--Libya | .700 | 1960 |
|-----------|------|------|

70. Farms on Rented Land as a Percentage of Total Farms
(55 cases)
- | | | |
|--------------|------|------|
| 29--Thailand | 17.2 | 1950 |
| 43--Libya | 8.5 | 1960 |
71. Income Distribution Before Taxes: Gini Index of Inequality (20 cases)
72. Income Distribution After Taxes: Gini Index of Inequality (12 cases)

Religion

73. Roman Catholics as a Percentage of Total Population, 1958 (118 cases)
- | | | |
|-----------------|-----|--|
| 71--Morocco | 5.1 | |
| 77--Libya | 4.3 | |
| 91.5--Cambodia | 1.2 | |
| 101.5--Ethiopia | .6 | |
| 103.5--Thailand | .5 | |
74. All Christians as a Percentage of Total Population (103 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| 50.5--Ethiopia | 48.0 | 1961 |
| 77.5--Morocco | 4.0 | 1961 |
| 77.5--Libya | 4.0 | 1961 |
| 93.5--Cambodia | .5 | 1958 |
| 93.5--Thailand | .5 | 1960 |
75. Moslems as a Percentage of Total Population (103 cases)
- | | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| 10.5--Libya | 95.0 | 1961 |
| 13.5--Morocco | 92.0 | 1961 |
| 26--Ethiopia | 43.0 | 1961 |
| 50--Cambodia | 2.0 | 1958 |
| 81.5--Thailand | .0 | 1960 |
-

Table 3

Extract of Data from Banks and Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey.

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>C</u>
1. Areal Grouping					
Central and South Africa		X			
North Africa			X	X	
Southeast Asia	X				X
2. Size					
Large(300,000-1.9 million sq. mi.)		X			
Medium(75,000-299,000 sq. mi.)	X		X		
Small(below 75,000 sq. mi.)				X	X
3. Population					
Large(17-99.9 million)	X				
Medium(6-16.9 million)		X	X		
Small(under 6 million)				X	X
4. Population Density					
Medium(100-299/sq. mi.)	X				
Low(below 100/sq. mi.)		X	X	X	X
5. Population Growth Rate					
High(2% or above)	X		X	X	
Low(less than 2%)					X
Unknown		X			
6. Urbanization					
High(20% or more of population in cities of 20,000 or more and 12.5% or more of population in cities of 100,000 or more)			X	X	
Low(less than 20% of population in cities of 20,000 or more and less than 12.5% of population in cities of 100,000 or more)	X	X			X
7. Agricultural Population					
High(over 66%)	X	X	X	X	X
8. Gross National Product					
Low(\$1-4.9 billion)	X	X	X		
Very low(under \$1 billion)				X	X
9. Per Capita Gross National Product					
Very low(under \$150)	X	X	X	X	X
10. International Financial Status					
Low(UN assessment of 0.05-0.24%)	X	X	X		
Very low(minimum UN assessment of 0.04%)				X	X

T E M L C

- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|-----|
| 11. Economic Development Status | | | | |
| Underdeveloped (reasonable prospect of attaining sustained economic growth by the mid-1970's) | | | | X |
| Very underdeveloped (little or no prospect of attaining sustained economic growth within the foreseeable future) | X | X | X | X |
| 12. Literacy Rate | | | | |
| Medium (50-89%) | X | | | |
| Low (10-49%) | | | | X X |
| Very low (under 10%) | | X | | |
| Unknown | | | X | |
| 13. Freedom of the Press | | | | |
| Intermittent (occasional or selective censorship of either domestic press or foreign correspondents) | | | X | X |
| Internally absent (strict domestic censorship; no restraint on foreign newsgathering, or selective cable-head censorship) | X | X | | X |
| 14. Newspaper Circulation per 1000 population | | | | |
| Low (10-99) | X | | X | |
| Very low (below 70) | | X | | X X |
| 15. Religious Configuration | | | | |
| Buddhist | X | | | X |
| Muslim | | | X | X |
| East Orthodox | | X | | |
| 16. Religious Homogeneity | | | | |
| Homogeneous | X | | X | X X |
| Heterogeneous | | X | | |
| 17. Racial Homogeneity | | | | |
| Homogeneous (90% or more of one race) | X | | X | X X |
| Heterogeneous (less than 90% of one race) | | X | | |
| 18. Linguistic Homogeneity | | | | |
| Homogeneous (majority of 85% or more; no significant single minority) | | | | X |
| Weakly heterogeneous (majority of 85% or more; significant minority of 15% or less) | X | | | |
| Strongly heterogeneous (no single group of 85% or more) | | X | X | |
| 19. Date of Independence | | | | |
| Before nineteenth century | X | X | | |
| After 1945 | | | X | X X |

T E M L C

20. Westernization
 Partially Westernized(no colonial relationship) X X
 Partially Westernized(colonial relationship) X X X
21. Former Colonial Ruler
 France X X X X
 Other X X X
22. Non-European autochthonous(self-modernizing extra-European society)
 Developed tutelary(developed society modernizing under tutelage) X X X
23. Political Modernization; Periodization
 Advanced(transitional phase completed) X
 Mid-transitional(entered transitional phase prior to 1945) X X
 Early transitional(entered transitional phase 1945 or later) X X
24. Ideological Orientation
 Traditional X X
 Ambiguous X X X
25. System Style
 Limited Mobilization X X X
 Non-Mobilization X X X
26. Constitutional Status of Present Regime
 Constitutional (government conducted with reference to recognized constitutional norms) X X
 Authoritarian (no effective constitutional limitation, or fairly regular recourse to extra-constitutional powers. Arbitrary Exercises of power confined to the political sector) X X X
27. Government Stability
 Government generally stable since World War II or major post-war constitutional change X X
 Government moderately stable since World War II or major post war constitutional change X X X

T E M L C

28. Representative character of current regime
 Polyarchic (broadly representative system) X
 Pseudo-polyarchic (ineffective representative or disguised oligarchic or autocratic system) X X
 Non-polyarchic (non-representative in form as well as content) X
 Ambiguous X
29. Current electoral system
 Non-competitive (single-list voting or no elected opposition) X
 Ambiguous X X
30. Freedom of Group Opposition
 Autonomous groups free to organize in politics, but limited in capacity to oppose government (includes absorption of actual or potential opposition leadership into government) X X
 Autonomous group tolerated informally and outside politics X X X
31. Political Enculturation
 High (integrated and homogeneous polity with little or no extreme opposition, communalism, fractionalism, disenfranchisement, or political non-assimilation) X
 Medium (less fully integrated polity with significant minority in extreme opposition, communalized, fractionalized, disenfranchised, or politically non-assimilated) X X X
 Low (relatively non-integrated or restrictive polity with majority or near majority in extreme opposition, communalized, fractionalized, disenfranchised, or politically non-assimilated) X
32. Sectionalism
 Extreme (one or more groups with extreme sectional feeling) X X X
 Moderate (one group with strong sectional feeling or several with moderate sectional feeling) X X
33. Interest articulation by associational groups
 Limited X
 Negligible X X X X
34. Interest articulation by institutional groups
 Very significant X X
 Significant X X X

T E M L C

35. Interest articulation by Non-associational groups
 Significant X X X
 Moderate X X
36. Interest articulation by anomic groups
 Occasional X X X X
 Infrequent X
37. Interest articulation by political parties
 Moderate X
 Negligible X
 Unascertainable X
 Irrelevant X X
38. Interest Articulation by Political parties
 Moderate X X
 Irrelevant X X X
39. Interest aggregation by executive
 Significant X X
 Limited X
 Negligible X X
40. Interest Aggregation by legislature
 Limited X
 Negligible X X X
 Irrelevant X
41. Party system: Quantitative
 One-party (all others non-existent, banned, non-participant, or adjuncts of dominant party in electoral activity. Includes "national fronts" and one-party fusional systems) X
 No parties, or all parties illegal or ineffective X X
 Ambiguous X
 Unascertainable X
42. Party System: Qualitative
43. Stability of Party system
 Moderately stable (relatively infrequent or non-abrupt system changes, or mixed situational-permanent party complex) X
 Unstable (all parties unstable, situational, X personalistic, or ad hoc)
 Irrelevant X

T E M L C

44. Personalism
 Pronounced (all parties highly personalistic or fractionalized along personalistic lines) X X
 Negligible (no parties with significant personalistic tendencies) X
45. Political Leadership
 Elitist (recruitment confined to a particular racial, social, or ideological stratum) X X
 Moderate elitist (recruitment largely, but not wholly confined to a particular racial, social, or ideological stratum) X
 Non-elitist (recruitment largely on the basis of achievement criteria only) X
 Ambiguous X
46. Leadership Charisma
 Pronounced X X X
 Moderate X X
 Negligible X
47. Vertical power distribution
 Limited federalism (federal structure with limited separation of pronounced "centralist" tendencies) X
 Formal and effective unitarism X X X X
48. Horizontal power distribution
 Limited (one branch of government without genuine functional autonomy, or two branches with limited functional autonomy) X X
 Negligible (complete dominance of government by one branch or by extra-governmental agency) X X X
49. Legislative-executive structure
 Monarchical-Parliamentary X X
 Monarchical X
 Ambiguous X
 Unascertainable X
50. Current status of legislature
 Partially effective (tendency toward domination by executive, or otherwise partially limited in effective exercise of legislative function) X X
 Wholly ineffective (restricted to consultative or "rubber-stamp" legislative function) X X X

T E M L C

51. Character of Legislature
 Bicameral X X X X
 Unascertainable X
52. Current status of executive
 Dominant X X X
 Strong X
 Unascertainable X
53. Character of Bureaucracy
 Semi-Modern (largely "rationalized"
 bureaucratic structure of limited efficiency
 because of shortage of skilled personnel,
 inadequacy of recruitment or performance
 criteria, excessive intrusion by non-
 administrative organs, or partially non-
 congruent social institutions) X X
 Traditional (largely non-rationalized
 bureaucratic structure performing in the
 context of an ascriptive or "deferential"
 Stratification system) X X X
54. Political participation by the military
 Interventive (presently exercises or has
 recently exercised direct power) X
 Supportive (performs para-political role in
 support of traditionalist, authoritarian,
 totalitarian, or modernizing regime) X X
 Neutral (apolitical, or of minor political
 importance) X X
55. Role of Police
 Politically significant (important continuing
 or intermittent political function in
 addition to law enforcement) X X X X
 Unascertained X
56. Character of legal system
 Civil Law X
 Mixed Civil-Muslim X X
 Other X
 Ambiguous X
57. Communist Bloc
 Non-Communist X X X X X
-

Table 4

Extract of Data from Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, 1964, Table 1, "Basic Data on Armed Forces of New Nations" pp. 10-11.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population (millions)</u>	<u>Date of Independence</u>	<u>Civil- Military Model</u>	<u>Political Role</u>	<u>Origin of Armed Forces</u>
Thailand	21,881	Non-col.	Military Oligarchy	Political Ruling Group	Non- Colonial
Cambodia	4,845	1953	Author- itarian- personal control	Mark of Sovereignty	Ex-Colonial
Morocco	10,550	1956	Democratic- Competitive	Mark of Sovereignty	Ex-Colonial
Ethiopia	21,000	Non-col.	Author- itarian- Personal control	Mark of Sovereignty	Non-Col.
Libya	1,172	1951	Author- itarian- personal control	Mark of Sovereignty	Post-Liber- ation

Extract of Data from Janowitz, Table 2, "Basic Data on Armed Forces of New Nations," pp. 20-21.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Armed Forces</u>	<u>Total Officers</u>	<u>Per Cent Army</u>	<u>Level of Expenditure (per cent)</u>	<u>Economic Develop- ment Index</u>
Thailand	134,000	---	80	Moderate(22)	2
Cambodia	28,000	2,000	97	Moderate(22)	3
Morocco	35,000	---	94	Moderate(20)	2
Ethiopia	30,000	---	97	High(27)	3
Libya	5,000	---	--	---	2

Table 5

Extract of Data from The Military Balance 1971-1972, pp. 30-61.

LIBYA

Population: 2,000,000

Military service: 18 months.

Total armed forces: 22,000

Estimated GNP 1970: \$4.0 billion.

Defence budget 1971-72; L30 million(\$84 million).

Army: 20,000

4 armoured battalions.

5 infantry battalions.

3 artillery battalions.

2 AA artillery battalions.

6 Centurion-5, 100 T-54/55 and 15 T-34/85 med tanks; Saladin armd cars; Shorland and Ferret scout cars; Saracen APC; 122mm guns, 105mm and 155mm howitzers; L40/70 Bofors AA guns. (an order for 188 Chieftain tanks from Britain is in abeyance.)

MOROCCO

Population: 16,000,000

Military service: 18 months.

Total armed forces: 57,500

Estimated GNP 1970: \$3.34 billion.

Defence budget 1971: 491 million dirham(\$97,000,000).

Army: 52,000.

1 armoured brigade.

3 motorized infantry brigades.

1 light security brigade.

1 parachute brigade.

12 independent infantry battalions.

2 camel corps battalions.

3 desert cavalry battalions.

4 artillery groups.

120 T-54 med tanks; 120 AMX-13 lt tanks; some EBR-75, and 50 AML-245 and M-8 armd cars; 40 M-3 half-track and 95 Czech APC; 25 Su-100 and AMX-105, and 50 M-56 90mm SF guns; 75mm and 105mm howitzers; 6 Alouette II/III helicopters.

Navy: 1,500.

1 frigate.

2 coastal escorts.

1 patrol boat(less than 100 tons).

2 landing ships.

Air Force: 4,000; 38 combat aircraft.

10 F-5A and 4F-5B interceptors.

24 Magister armed trainers.

45 T-6 and 25 T-28 trainers.

10 C-47 and 11 C-119 transports.

OH-13, 24 AB-204, 12 AB-205 and 6 HH-43 helicopters.

(12 MiG-17 fighter-bombers are in storage).

Para-Military Forces: 23,000.

2,250 Gendarmerie including 2 mobile security battalions;

750 Royal Guards; 20,000 Auxiliaries.

ETHIOPIA

Population: 25,800,000.

Voluntary military service.

Total armed forces: 42,750.

Estimated GNP 1970: US\$1.75 billion.

Defence budget 1970-71: E\$89,100,000(US \$35,640,000).

Army: 39,000.

4 infantry divisions, 8,000 men each (incl Imperial Guard).

1 tank battalion.

1 airborne infantry battalion.

1 armoured car squadron.

4 artillery battalions.

5 air defence batteries.

2 engineer battalions.

55 M-41 med tanks; 15 M-24 lt tanks; about 50 APC.

Navy: 1,500.

1 training ship (ex-seaplane tender).

5 patrol boats.

2 motor torpedo boats.

4 gun boats (less than 100 tons).

Air Force: 2,250; 48 combat aircraft.

1 bomber squadron with 4 Canberra B-2.

1 fighter-bomber squadron with 11 F-86F.

1 ground-attack squadron with 13 t-28.

1 ground-attack squadron with 8 Saab-17.

1 fighter squadron with 10 F-5A.

1 reconnaissance squadron with 2 T-33.

1 tpt sqn with 4 C-47, 2 C-54, 4 C-119G, 3 Dove and 1 Il-14.

3 trg sqns with 20 Safir, 15 T-28A and 11 T-33.

4 Alouette II and 2 Mi-8 helicopters.

Para-military Forces: 13,750.

6,000 Territorial Army-active strength. 6,800 mobile
emergency police force; 1,500 frontier guards.

CAMBODIA

Population: 7,000,000.

Voluntary military service. (Conscription is authorized but
not yet in force).

Estimated GNP 1970: \$0.91 billion.

Total armed forces: 179,000.

Defence budget 1971: 18,650 million riels(\$336,000,000).

Army: 175,000.

200 infantry and commando battalions.

1 tank regiment.

1 armoured car battalion.

3 parachute battalions.

M-24 and AMX-13 lt tks; M-8 and M-20 armd cars; M-3 scout cars;

BTR-152 APC; 105mm howitzers and Soviet 76mm and 122mm guns;

40mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns.

Navy: 1,600(including 150 marines).

2 patrol vessels.

2 support gunboats.

2 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
6 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
4 landing craft.
Air Force: 2,400; 7 combat aircraft.
7 T-28 Trojan ground-attack aircraft.
5 C-47, 5 An-2 and 1 Il-14 transports.
3 MiG-15 UTI, 11 Horizon and 4 Yak-18 trainers.
4 Alouette II, 1 Mi-4 and 2 H-34 helicopters.
Para-Military Forces: 150,000.

THAILAND

Population: 35,000,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 175,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: \$6.1 billion.
Defence budget 1970-71: 5,413,800,000 baht (\$260,300,000).
Army: 130,000.
4 infantry divisions (including 3 tank battalions).
1 regimental combat team.
1 SAM battery with Hawk.
M-24 and M-41 lt tanks; M-2 and M-16 arm'd half-tracks; M-8
arm'd cars; M3A1 scout cars; about 200 M-113 APC; 105mm and
155mm howitzers; 16 FH-1100 and 6 OH-23F hel.
Deployment: 11,250 in South Vietnam.
Navy: 21,500 (including 6,500 marines).
1 destroyer escort.
3 frigates (and 3 on order).
1 escort minesweeper.
17 submarine chasers.
4 coastal minesweepers.
2 coastal minelayers.
11 gunboats (1 less than 100 tons).
3 patrol gun boats.
8 landing ships.
8 landing craft.
1 maritime recon squadron with HU-16 and H-2.
Air Force: 23,500; 144 combat aircraft.
11 F-5A and F-5B fighter-bombers.
20 F-86F day fighters.
1 RF-33A reconnaissance aircraft.
55 F-4D, 40 F-6 and 16 OV-10 COIN aircraft.
25 C-47 and 12 C-123B transports.
About 60 hel, including 35 CH-34 and 23 UH-1H.
4 battalions of airfield defence troops.
Para-Military Forces: 10,000 Volunteer Defence Corps; 8,000
Border Police.

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